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Abstract
This paper explores the transformations of the housebuilding industry under the policy requirement to build on previously
developed land (PDL). This requirement was a key lever in promoting the sustainable urban development agenda of UK
governments from the early 1990s to 2010 and has survived albeit somewhat relaxed and permutated in the latest National Planning
Policy Framework (NPPF). The paper therefore looks at the way in which the policy push towards densification and mixed use
affected housebuilders’ business strategy and practices and their ability to cope with the 2007 downturn of the housing market and
its aftermath. It also points out the eventual feedback of some of these practices into planning policy.
Following the gradual shift of British urban policy focus towards sustainability which started in the early 1990s, new
configurations of actors, new skills, strategies and approaches to managing risk emerged in property development and house-
building. There were at least two ways in which housebuilders could have responded to the requirements of developing long term
mixed use high density projects on PDL. One way was to develop new products and to employ practices and combinations of
practices involving phasing, a flexible approach to planning applications and innovative production methods. Alternatively, they
could approach PDL development as a temporary turn of policy or view mixed use high density schemes as a niche market to be
explored without drastically overhauling the business model of the entire firm. These transformations of the UK housebuilding
sector were unfolding during a long period of buoyancy in the housing market which came to an end in 2007. Very little is known
both about how housebuilder strategies and production practices evolved during the boom years as well as about how these firms
coped with the effects of the 2007 market downturn.
The paper draws on published data (company annual reports, government statistics) and primary material (stakeholder
interviews, planning applications, unpublished project specific information) to explore two different approaches that two major
housebuilders (the Berkeley Group and George Wimpey – now Taylor Wimpey) followed during the boom years in response to the
changing requirements, risks and uncertainties embedded in the residential development process. The recent turmoil in the property
markets acted as an ‘acid test’ to business models and practices and not all firms survived it. What is more, the UK government is
now embedding some of those business practices into policy, thus completing one loop in a co-evolving feedback spiral between
planning policy and business strategy.
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The emergence of the sustainability agenda during
the last three decades brought to the fore considerations
of balancing economic growth with environmental and
social concerns. One of the effects it had on urban
policy in a UK context was a renewed attempt to bring
development back into the cities, to promote compac-
tion, mixed uses, urban living and sustainable commu-
nities. Almost 18 years ago, in 1995, the introduction of
quantitative targets for the percentage of new dwellings
to be built on previously developed land (PDL) marked
the launch of a series of policy initiatives that affected
the business environment in which the housebuilding
sector is currently operating. Thus, the redevelopment
of PDL became a major consideration for everyone
engaged with the way the built environment is
produced, consumed and experienced. In spite of the
decision by the UK government to remove the
quantitative policy targets attached to PDL redevelop-
ment, the inextricable links between the sustainability
agenda and land redevelopment means that the issue
should remain topical, one way or another, for the
foreseeable future. What is more, measures like the
introduction of the pre-application consultation require-
ment as part of the Localism Act (UK Government,
2011) are reinforcing the diffusion amongst developers
of business practices originally implemented by house-
builders who wanted to address the risks of large scale
mixed use PDL redevelopment schemes.The long term implications of the policy shifts
described above should not be underestimated. The
requirements for PDL redevelopment marked a turning
of the policy tide away from ‘anti-urbanism’/‘decentr-
ism’ towards ‘urbanism’/‘centrism’ and city ‘compac-
tion’ (Breheny, 1996) and thus the beginning of an era of
government policy promoting urban settlements with a
wide social and land use mix in an effort to combine
environmental, social and economic goals. Documents
like the Urban Task Force (UTF) report (Urban Task
Force, 1999) or the ‘‘Planning for the Communities of
the Future’’ White Paper (DETR, 1998b) reflected the
spirit of that time and proved very influential in setting
the agenda and in structuring future debates and policy
directions (see DETR, 2000a). The cautious reactions of
several stakeholders to the effective abolition of the
sequential approach and the ‘brownfield test’ in an
interim version of the National Planning Policy
Framework (NPPF) (DCLG, 2011) and the more
positive reception of their restitution in a later version
(DCLG, 2012) demonstrates how deeply embedded in
policy discourse the densification approach has now
become as part of the polysemantic sustainability
discourse.
As will be examined in the following sections of this
paper, this consistent policy turn, in part expressed
through the promotion of land recycling and in part
expressed through the densification and mixity impera-
tives, had significant consequences for the production of
the built environment and even more so for housing
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rampant house price inflation that housebuilders had to
address this fundamental shift of their business
environment. In rather broadbrush terms, so far as
housebuilders were concerned, this policy shift meant
amongst other things that the sources and the types of
land available to them were to be dramatically altered.
Given the importance of land inputs to any house-
builder’s business model it would not be an exaggera-
tion to call this change in their business environment an
instance with potentially significant effects on their
survival prospects.
Evidence supporting the view that ‘‘new ways of
doing things’’ were emerging in the production of
housing in the UK, affected by changes in policy and
thus in the nature of land availability and customer
demand was offered by Karadimitriou (2003) whereas
this argument was further elaborated in Adams (2004)
and Karadimitriou (2005). Following the 2007/2008
market downturn and the subsequent change in
government in 2010 there is renewed scope to look
into what these new ‘ways’ have developed into, how
they relate to the current business and policy environ-
ment, their effects on the organisation of housebuilding
firms and on housebuilder business strategies as well as
how these strategies coped with the market downturn
and the subsequent stabilisation at a lower price and
output level.
This paper will argue that there is significant benefit
to be gained in terms of our understanding of the
housebuilding sector from conceptualising housebuild-
ing companies as profit seeking organisations with a
diverse range of objectives, the most crucial of those
being the survival of the organisation itself. Faced with
a shift in the policy environment, housebuilders
developed strategies and practices that aimed at
ensuring survival and profitable operation within that
environment. These strategies and practices more often
than not evolved from pre-existing capacities combined
with newly developed skills.
Although the strategies and practices examined in
this paper emerged in response to the changing policy
environment, the objectives that they satisfy do not
necessarily align with the objectives of policy itself.
What is more, as the case of the ‘pre-application
consultation’ highlights, Government policy and actor
strategies are often tied in a process of constant
interaction and mutual adjustment. The production of
the built environment not only reflects this process of
co-evolution of policy and business practices but also
influences it, thus putting in place the preconditions for
the next economic cycle.In terms of methodology, this research is based on a
choice of cases made with replication rather than
sampling in mind. This means that each selected site
and firm serves the specific purpose of being useful in
producing similar results or ‘‘contrasting results but for
predictable reasons’’ (Yin, 1992, p. 46). Berkeley is a
company often referred to as one of the best run and
most astute strategically, a sector leader and a
trendsetter. George Wimpey was a rather typical
example of a top-10 housebuilding company following
a more traditionalist approach closely associated with
greenfield development.
This case study research strategy has both a historical
as well as a direct observation/interviewing character.
The use of multiple sources of evidence allows for
corroboration of the information thus increasing the
validity and the accuracy of the research findings. The
paper follows a combined quantitative and qualitative
approach in order to analyse the primary data collected
via interviews and archival research and the secondary
data found in published government statistics, databases
and company annual reports. Aggregate macro data
published by the DCLG and relating to land use change,
the housebuilding sector and housing production have
been analysed mainly through the use of descriptive
statistics in order to understand the shifts taking place at
the level of the housebuilding sector and in the country
as a whole. Firm-related financial data mainly deriving
from company annual reports have also been analysed
quantitatively to calculate simple ratios (margins, etc.)
that paint a clearer picture of company performance.
Qualitative directed content analysis (see Hsieh &
Shannon, 2005) of interviews, printed and electronic
material was used in order to understand issues relating
to corporate strategy and norms and routines at the
project level. The Estates Gazette Interactive (EGi)
property database was used in order to uncover the
transaction history of each site and the actors involved
with each site at key points in time. Planning application
information and project information was retrieved by
using the online portal of the local planning authority
(Wandsworth). Articles from online editions of daily
newspapers (The Daily Telegraph, The Financial
Times) and specialised journals (Estates Gazette,
Planning Magazine, Housebuilder Magazine) where
used in order to find out more information about key
points in corporate history (like mergers and acquisi-
tions).
Altogether 12 key individuals where interviewed
using semi-structured face to face extended interviews
(or phone interviews in two cases where a visit was not
possible). The questionnaires covered eight different
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process, actor roles and relationships, corporate
strategy, corporate assumptions about and expectations
for the future, established norms, rules and routines and
the way they apply in the company’s operations, the
effects of changes in planning policy on corporate
strategy and operations/project development, financial
information relating to the project, site specific
information and history. The interviewees included
senior managers/directors, project managers, architects
and planners in both companies. In addition to corporate
interviewees a second set of interviews was done with
local authority planners and local community repre-
sentatives though it was specifically focused on site
history, objections to the development and the approach
that each housebuilder and the local authority followed.
These interviews, together with references in the media
allowed in many instances to triangulate the various
statements found in the annual reports on which the
research drew heavily in order to understand the views
that the company’s management expressed to the
shareholders and the world at large.
It is not possible nor would it be desirable to claim
that what the research uncovers can be extrapolated to
the industry as a whole. The research design and scope
does not allow it, however the research uncovers two
rather important responses from two firms and shows
how they could have an effect at a wider scale as they
serve as plausible explanations of what other firms
might be doing. It is both through statistical or other
quantitative methods as well as case studies that any
inferences could be made. This approach is suggested
amongst others in the work of Guy and Henneberry
(2002) as the way critical science should approach its
object of examination. However, more research into
other firms’ attitudes and strategies could shed more
light into industry-wide trends.
Following the introduction, the paper discusses the
evolutionary character of business strategy and practice
and explores the co-evolutionary relationship of
business and policy. It summarises developments in
planning policy that affected the land supply regime and
the requirements these changes placed on housebuilders
during the last 20 or so years. Within this context,
housebuilders found themselves faced with a set of
challenges, some familiar to them and some others less
so. Section 3 moves on to explore the macroscopic
changes in the output of the housebuilding industry and
their link to policy. In Section 4 the paper looks into how
the strategies of two prominent housebuilders evolved
first as a response to the changing policy environment
and then as a result of the recent market downturn.Section 5 explores those strategies further and delves at
the project level by looking into two PDL development
projects, one for each developer. It therefore highlights
the different norms and routines that each housebuilder
developed at the project level as a result of their
strategic realignment within the context of a volatile
market. The last section summarises the key findings
and concludes that although it cannot be claimed that
the cases examined in the paper demonstrate the full
range of strategies and practices one could encounter
they nevertheless highlight two distinct instances of
housebuilder adaptation with significantly different
outcomes.
2. The co-evolution of planning policy and
business strategy
As far as housing and planning policy are concerned,
the shift to PDL re-use was primarily introduced
through a stream of regularly updated policy documents
mainly in the form of White papers and Planning Policy
Guidance (PPG) notes. For example, following the
Department of the Environment’s new environmental
strategy (DoE, 1990) the PPG3 of 1992 directed
housing development towards more use of brownfield
land. Then, following the 1995 White Paper ‘Our future
homes’ (UK Government, 1995) and the concern caused
by future household growth projections reflected in
‘‘Household Growth: Where Shall We Live?’’ (UK
Government, 1996) the government set a target for 50%
of new housing development to be built on brownfield
land, raised to 60% in 1998, shortly after the Labour
party was elected to power.
A few years later the revised PPG3 of 2000 (DETR,
2000b) introduced the housing capacity studies and the
sequential approach to the release of land for
development. It also required LPAs to re-examine
existing land allocations to fit the PDL re-use,
densification, mixed use and social inclusion policies.
It was further strengthened by Planning Policy
Statement (PPS) 1 of 2005 (ODPM, 2005b) which
set out the key sustainability principles that would guide
planning policies and decisions for years to come. The
updated PPG3 (ODPM, 2005c) continued along the
same lines and soon thereafter PPS3 (DCLG, 2006) and
the Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS) framework
modified but, if anything, enhanced this policy regime
even further. Thereafter, Local Authorities were bound
to have PDL ‘land targets’ and ‘trajectories’ in place, in
compliance with the Regional and National policy and
targets. By the end of 2008. Caroline Flint (Minister of
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comment that:
The re-use of Brownfield land lies at the heart of a
wide range of Government policies and English
Partnerships’ work in developing a National Brown-
field Strategy is an important step towards achieving
our ambitious targets for housing growth and
underpins our policy for the revival of our towns
and cities and for achieving more sustainable
patterns of development. (DCLG, 2008, p. 3)
Following the change of government in 2010 and the
subsequent phasing out of the RSS-PPS system, the
NPPF introduces a set of new policy directions and
requirements with a view to facilitating economic
growth. Its latest version (DCLG, 2012) quotes the re-
use of PDL as one of its core principles and applies a
sequential test to the location of ‘main town centre uses’.
In this sustainability discourse ‘greenfields’ and
‘brownfields’ have been counterposed in a dialectical
way, as polar extremes, examples of what is good and
what is not (Karadimitriou, Doak, & Cidre, 2010;
Murdoch, 2004). The ‘clean’ and ‘natural’ greenfields
became even more sacred. Their well-entrenched
sanctity was reaffirmed through their juxtaposition
against the equally ill-defined category of ‘contami-
nated’ and ‘derelict’ brownfields, positioned at the
opposite extreme. In a society where the ‘rural idyll’ has
exceptional cultural significance it should not come as a
surprise that any attempt to divert the course of urban
development from an expansionary paradigm towards
an ‘urban renaissance’ would be accompanied by strong
symbolical references to the greenfields and the
brownfields.
By the same token however, brownfields have
become a more acceptable option for future develop-
ment to be directed into. Since the early 1990s both
Conservative and Labour governments, have subscribed
to this agenda and have pursued it with remarkable
consistency. The planning system, through the control
of the release of land for development, was used as a
mechanism to promote this agenda. This in turn affected
the types of built environments the development
industry, and therefore housebuilders, were called upon
to produce. In the current UK context this intervention
through the planning system is probably one of the few
ideologically acceptable ways through which govern-
ment can actually intervene in order to direct private
business interests.
It can be plausibly argued that the outcome of the
densification policies of the last couple of decades was
the disruption of the flow of developable greenfield landinto housebuilders’ landbanks and the devalorisation of
their existing landbanks as it became increasingly
difficult to gain planning permission for developing
them. Instead, PDL became a key component of total
land supply for which housebuilders knew they stood a
good chance of getting permission to build on. This
change in policy however imposed more than a
substantive economic cost to housebuilders: it required
them to adjust their operation in order to be able to
provide the new types of residential built environments
that both policy and the economics of PDL redevelop-
ment require. It would be unreasonable to expect the
whole industry to approach this challenge from exactly
the same angle, respond to it in exactly the same way
and at exactly the same time. One also has to bear in
mind that apart from anything else, most of the period
1995–2007 was characterised by unprecedented house
price inflation that created an environment favourable to
the housebuilding sector’s profitability and made any
need for strategic realignment much less pressing.
According to Porter (1980, 1985) technological,
political, or social changes are the key factors affecting
the business environment any firm is operating in, a
point also made by Leonard-Barton (1998). The factors
that Porter recognises as having potentially strategic
importance are ‘‘long run changes in growth; changes in
buyer segments served; buyers’ learning; reduction of
uncertainty; diffusion of proprietary knowledge; accu-
mulation of experience; expansion (or contraction) in
scale; changes in input and currency costs; product
innovation; marketing innovation; process innovation;
structural change in adjacent industries; government
policy change; entries and exits’’ (Porter, 1985, p. 164).
In his discussion of paradigm shifts, Dosi (1982)
argues that ‘economic forces’ and ‘institutional and
social factors’ work as filters, ‘selective devices’, that
allow only certain ‘paths’ to be followed. However, the
set of feasible futures constitutes a much larger pool
from which the selection is made. Once a paradigm is
established, exactly because of the ‘bounded’ nature of
human rationality, it has a powerful ‘exclusionary’
effect in the sense that it becomes the ‘normal’ way of
doing things and therefore focuses the efforts of relevant
agents in ‘refining’ it rather than substituting it
altogether. This refinement process is the ‘normal’
technological progress. In similar fashion to the
management literature Dosi and Marengo (1993) argue
that the capacity of the firm to adapt within each ‘path’
or, even more, to contribute to the ‘paradigm shift’ is
determined by the ‘‘problem-solving features of
particular sets of organisational interactions, norms
and – to some extent – explicit strategies’’ in other
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1 The examination of the ‘interaction dynamics’ of selection how-
ever are a much more complex issue. See Dosi (2000, p. 25).
2 This behaviour is hardly ‘profit maximising’ in the sense of a
‘‘. . .a global, faultless, once-and-for-all optimisation over a given
choice set comprising all objectively available alternatives.’’ (Nelson
& Winter, 1982, p. 31).words ‘competencies’ comprise the set of organisa-
tional routines of the firm whereas strategies are seen as
the higher-level link between competencies and the
external environment.
These ideas are echoed in Porter’s arguments on the
competitive strategies and the competitive advantage of
industries (Porter, 1980, 1985, 1998). Institutional
structures, such as ‘ways of doing things’ or ‘para-
digms’ arise through habitual behaviour (Gruneberg &
Ive, 2000a, p. 22), through repetition of routines starting
from the individual but extending up to the level of the
firm. Indeed one of the firm’s main functions is to ensure
that individuals do behave according to certain routines
in order to achieve specific aims of that organisation
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). In that respect, the notion of
collaborative advantage deriving from either interunit
collaboration (Hansen & Nohria, 2004) or collaboration
between stakeholders (Huxman, 1996) will be of
particular interest when this paper looks into practices
affecting the competitive advantage of the two firms.
The firms of today have inherited many of their
characteristics from the past. In the words of Hamel and
Prahalad (1994) each firm is characterised by the ‘‘. . .
biases, assumptions and presuppositions. . .’’ of man-
agers, as well as ‘‘. . .beliefs, values and norms. . .’’
about markets, clients, stakeholder interests, competi-
tors, etc. They interchangeably call these established
sets of norms and routines ‘managerial frames’ or
‘genes’/’genetic coding’, meaning: an established
social structure with its own rules and routines and
self-replication dynamics. This ‘code’ is a result of a
particular set of environmental conditions. When the
environment changes this ‘genetic inheritance’ may
actually become a threat to the firm’s survival and the
firm will need to shed it. Business strategy is then a way
to optimise a firm’s response to its environment by
exploiting its strengths and its weaknesses in the face of
constantly changing opportunities and threats (Mon-
tgomery & Porter, 1991).
Porter sees strategy as the process of combining
activities in order to gain an advantageous position out
of the many possible and asserts that the only way for a
business to perform better than its rivals is to ‘‘establish
a difference that it can preserve’’ (Porter, 1998, p. 40).
He therefore concludes that ‘‘Competitive strategy is
about being different. It means deliberately choosing a
different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of
value’’ (Porter, 1998, p. 45). The idea promoted by
Porter (1980, 1985, 1998) is that a company’s view of
new ‘ways of doing things’ depends on the usefulness of
this ‘new way’ in establishing difference, thus assisting
the company’s competitive strategy. Insofar as diffusionis concerned, if a ‘new way’ offers a competitive
advantage then it is likely to find imitators who will
increase in size and number, whereas the size and
number of those who stick to ways unsuitable to the new
environment should presumably decline. As a result,
this dynamic should affect the size of output as well as
the relative presence of different types of businesses. As
in any such process of adaptation, the element of time is
key in the sense that it often can take several years for
such dynamics to play out and for the outcomes to
become noticeable at the aggregate level. Although a
crisis is not a necessary requirement for business
practices to evolve it does put existing business models
to the test. Thus, business practices (for example high
gearing) that may have appeared to be suitable for the
circumstances of a property boom may prove destruc-
tive during a property market downturn.
Whereas it may be easier to quantitatively examine1
the outcomes of a selection process, the examination of
the patterns of actor behaviour requires an examination
of the strategies and the learning process of organisa-
tions or individuals. Here is how Nelson and Winter
(1982) summarise the basic characteristics of the
evolutionary approach:
 The behaviour of economic actors is purposeful.
Actors have goals whose accomplishment they
pursue. In that pursuit they build and follow rules
and procedures, ‘policies’, which reflect adequate
calculations but are not necessarily optimal in the
neo-classical sense.
 One major goal of economic actors is ‘profit seeking’,
they follow ‘‘policies’’ whose profitability they
‘‘inexactly compare, from time to time, with
individual alternatives that present themselves by
processes not entirely under their control’’.2
Competition is an important factor that affects the
decision-making process of economic actors. Busi-
nesses constantly make decisions affecting their future.
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) argue that competition for
the future, strategic competition, is about ‘opportunity
share’ in contrast to competition for the present, which
is concerned with market share and operational
efficiency. New market niches are even more unclear
in their operation compared to existing markets.
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are not driven by the anticipation of immediate financial
returns but by the prospect of having a leading position
in future industry structure.
It is not surprising therefore that Hamel and Prahalad
also argue that very often it is ‘contrarian’ companies
that excel in this strategic competition. The contrarians
are firms that will challenge the ‘orthodoxy’ i.e. the
established way of doing things, the managerial and
wider social ‘mental frames: ‘‘To discover the future it
is not necessary to be a visionary, but it is absolutely
vital to be unorthodox’’ (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994, p.
99). Companies have to dream of products not yet
created and which by definition do not reflect customer
surveys since it is extremely difficult for customers to
imagine what is feasible. Not only has the firm to dream
about the future (strategic intent), it also has to devise
the way to get there. ‘‘Strategic architecture’’ is ‘‘. . .a
blueprint for how to turn the dream into reality’’ (Hamel
& Prahalad, 1994, p. 107). In order to do so, the firm has
to ‘unlearn’ and replace the part of its past that does not
usefully serve its ‘blueprint’.
Several factors have changed in tandem to the
changes in government policy since the early 1990s
(reflecting global cultural and ideological shifts) most
importantly long term market growth prospects;
product, process and marketing innovation and other
government policies (like environmental legislation).
When faced with this type of changes and the
uncertainty they entail, many companies are reluctant
to exit markets that still appear profitable or to abandon
well-established practices and technologies that may
however be unsuitable for the new business reality.
Barlow and Duncan (1994) as well as Barlow and King
(1992) argue that the high degree of uncertainty
inherent in British speculative housebuilding forces
companies to stick to norms, strategies and positions
that are suboptimal. Ball’s argument is that it would be
very difficult for any housebuilding company to survive
without the capacity to manage the uncertainty inherent
at all levels and phases of development (see for example
Ball, 1999). However, it could be argued that one way to
tackle uncertain conditions would be to innovate so as to
exploit the opportunities they offer. Therein arguably
lies a key to competitive advantage and to long term
firm survival and growth.
In any type of land development, as Byrne (1996) has
noted, there are certain tasks involved: future demand
has to be estimated in terms of quantity and quality/
type, sites have to be identified and secured to satisfy
this demand, the same sites have to be designed and
planned to meet this demand, finance has to be found inorder to fund acquisitions and construction, the whole
process of design and construction has to be coordinated
and managed and the end product has to be sold or let
and managed/maintained after that. He thereafter
separates development in four stages: Appraisal,
Acquisition, Production/Construction and Disposal
and identifies the uncertainties inherent in these
processes. This list of functions is very close to de
Magalhaes’ conceptualisation of agents and functions
(de Magalhaes, 1996, 1998, 1999).
Byrne elaborates that the sources of uncertainty in
the appraisal stage have to do with changes or lack of
clarity in the project’s specifications or other para-
meters, not realistic assumptions about aspects of the
project as well as the market and not clearly specified
objectives and design characteristics. In acquisition the
biggest source of uncertainty is the response of the
planning authority to the demands of the developer
therefore usually the final purchase of the land is done
after planning permission is granted. This means that
profits are squeezed because a high price is paid for the
land. During production, uncertainty arises around the
project’s characteristics therefore the more details are
finalised prior to construction the less uncertain the
project becomes, it is also easier to standardise its
production hence costs drop. Finally, in disposal, the
final product is released to the market and the original
assumptions are tested. Rent/prices and investment
yields are the biggest source of uncertainty in that
process.
Detailed descriptions and analyses of housing
provision and production in the UK can be found
amongst others in the work of Ball (1983), Gruneberg
and Ive (2000a, 2000b), Adams and Watkins (2002),
and Barlow and Duncan (1994). Between them, they
argue that the main structure is ‘speculative’, covering
the private owner–occupier market, complemented by a
residualised ‘contract’ structure providing for the social
housing sector. It has also been argued elsewhere
(Adams, 2004; Breheny, 1998; Karadimitriou, 2003,
2005) that there are strong indications of the shift of
housebuilding in the UK towards PDL redevelopment
from a predominantly expansionary process, geared
towards building on new, undeveloped land.
According to Adams and Watkins (2002, p. 129),
housebuilders have to become exceptionally good at
deploying special skills in three generic functions:
Landbanking/land management, planning and market-
ing in order to make greenfield speculative house-
building feasible. These skills, institutionalised through
norms and routines, also reflect areas where the firm
integrates labour, land, money and knowledge inputs.
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two distinct aspects to it; namely development/whole-
sale and construction (Wellings, 2006). It is through
development/wholesale that traditionally the higher
margins are achieved in the industry, it is also the part
which carries the biggest uncertainties. Construction on
the other hand usually is a lower margin activity than
can be disassociated from housebuilding as such,
housebuilders are not primarily construction companies
and indeed as Wellings points out (2006) mergers
between construction companies and housebuilders are
rarely successful.
Based on the above rationale and assuming that there
is actually a difference between non-PDL and PDL
housebuilding, it could be argued that the ‘greenfield/
expansionist’ and ‘brownfield/consolidation’ approaches
to urban growth could give rise to several different
alternatives to organising the housebuilding development
process. This variety would be generated to a large extend
by the great number of uncertainties involved in that
process and the different ways businesses can respond to
that uncertainty. The actors involved in each alternative
will have developed their own norms, routines, skills and
practices, their individual ‘genetic coding’.
Changes in government policy that relate to the types
of land input used by housebuilders pose a significant
challenge to the industry. In order to be able to adjust to
this environment a company would have to strategically
reorient itself. It is the adoption of norms, routines,
skills and practices that are more suitable for the
business environment which determines the survival of
housebuilding firms but it would be impossible for a
company to develop these without strategic commit-
ment and intent, very often deriving from a contrarian
approach. Having said that, if the adaptation is
successful it may well act as an example of imitators.
A successful adaptation will enhance the competitive
advantage of those who adopt it, allowing them to
survive and grow, thus changing their relative position
within the industry. To the extent that this adaptation is
linked to qualitative changes in output, its diffusion will
lead to changes in the aggregate output of the industry
as a whole.
3. The changing face of housebuilding
This section elaborates on the housebuilder
responses regarding the way they organise and execute
the production of housing developments and the type of
spaces they are producing. It examines the changes
occurring at the macro level, for the industry as a whole.
Whereas this section elaborates on the industry’sresponse at the aggregate level, Sections 4 and 5 will
explore the strategic responses of the Berkeley Group
and George Wimpey (now Taylor Wimpey, hereafter
referred to as Wimpey) towards the new policy regime
and its implementation.
The analysis in this section enhances, with the
benefit of hindsight, the arguments first set out in
Karadimitriou (2003, 2005) and Adams (2004). It was
argued then that in response to the qualitative and
quantitative change to the land input into the production
process the industry has changed the types of dwellings
and developments produced until the mid-1990s.
Housebuilding in the UK was mainly based on
expansion into the ‘greenfields’, therefore house-
builders have developed certain skills, norms and
routines permeating the ‘‘structure of organisation of
agency relationships’’ (de Magalhaes, 1996) that
underlies housebuilding production processes. Land-
banking and land management, planning and marketing
have been the foci of recent literature as the three
‘generic’ skills required for housebuilders to be
successful (Adams & Watkins, 2002). The configura-
tion of spaces, the developments, produced by this
structure of agency relationships are low density
housing developments, marketed on the basis of their
environmental amenity and aiming at customers
seeking family-friendly built environments.
Several interviewees confirmed the conceptualisa-
tion of the 3 generic functions (Adams & Watkins,
2002) when they referred to the crucial elements of a
housebuilding business. Many interviewees also
confirmed that in housebuilding a great deal depends
on the speed of transformation from site purchase, to
building, to next site purchase (see also DCLG,
2007). One of them, a person involved in depth into
the strategic planning and landbanking practices of
housebuilding, said that the basic capacities of
housebuilding firm are:
Ability in securing sites, in transforming acquisition
into planning permission as quickly as possible, in
marketing and selling houses and in buying a new
site.
The first thing to note is that policy-induced changes
in the amount and the type of the land released from the
planning system for housing has increased the propor-
tion of PDL used for housebuilding. This change is
linked at least to two types of changes in the qualitative
aspects of output until 2007: (i) the substantial rise in
the proportion of flats as a percentage of new dwelling
production and (ii) the significant increase on average in
the densities of new developments (Karadimitriou,




























Fig. 3.1. Average density of dwellings in new developments, England
1990–2010.
Source: Adapted from Land Use Change Statistics in England (DETR,

































Fig. 3.2. Average % of dwellings built by density category and type of
land, England 1994–2003.
Source: Adapted from ODPM (2004).2005). Since trend (i) is slowly reversing since 2008,
dwelling production could be seen as comprising two
generic product range categories, one based on low
density more land-intensive development and another
based on high density more capital-intensive develop-
ment.
The change in output however also reflects changes
in the nature of the generic skills required for
housebuilders to stay in business. The traditional
strategic planning and landbanking capabilities had to
be complemented by flexibility in design and construc-
tion and the capacity to ‘negotiate’ throughout the
development process. Marketing has also changed its
focus as the vibrancy of urban living re-emerged as a
key marketing theme during the 2000s. This enhanced
flexibility and the new marketing focus are under-
pinning the long term trend towards specialisation that
previous research has identified (Barlow, 2000).
Furthermore the ability to provide higher levels of
customisation through a more flexible approach also
taps into significant latent demand for more customer
input in dwelling production (Barlow, 2000).
Wellings (2002) as well as Nicol and Hooper (1999)
indicate that from the 1990s onwards the trend of
housebuilding industry consolidation has accelerated
and several leading firms have strived to gain market
share and to achieve output growth through Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&As) which, as mentioned in Section 2,
may well indicate increased ‘competition for the
present’ in the absence of strong strategic visioning
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). This trend continued
throughout the 2000s and some of the most impressive
deals happened just as the market was beginning to turn,
for example Wilson Bowden’s acquisition by Barratt for
£2.2bn, the purchase of Crest Nicholson by a
consortium of HBOS and Sir Tom Hunter for £715m
and a similar deal between McCarthy & Stone and
HBOS for £1.1bn.
The upward turn in the percentage of dwellings built
on PDL throughout most of the 2000s was combined
with a marked increase in the average density of newly
built developments which also begun to pick up
considerably since 2002, almost a decade after
densification made its first appearance as a policy
direction, and has stabilised between 40 and 44
dwellings per hectare since 2007. This level is around
70% higher than that of 2001 (Fig. 3.1).
More evidence pointing to the process of differ-
entiation of the type of developments produced
depending on the type of land used, comes from further
analysis of the distribution of housing output per
density category (Fig. 3.2) for the years 1994–2003.Unfortunately it was not possible to find data for later
periods so this analysis can only present a specific trend
which occurred during a time when the policy push
towards densification was gaining momentum (see
Karadimitriou, 2005). Of all dwellings built on non-
PDL during the period 1999–2003, 58% where built in
densities below 30 dw/ha and 76% where built at
densities below 40 dw/ha. Only 6% of the dwellings
built on non-PDL where built in schemes with densities
above 81 dw/ha. More importantly, this distribution has
not changed significantly between 1994 and 2003 which
indicates a relatively stable development model (low
density non-PDL configuration).
On the other hand, a significant 22% of total dwelling
output on PDL was built in developments of 81 dw/ha
or more during the period 1999–2003, up from 17% in
1994–1998. In contrast to that, 38% of dwellings built
on PDL during the period 1999–2003 were below the
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Non-PDL 6% 5% UP 18% 16% UP 76% 79% DOWN
PDL 22% 17% UP 24% 25% DOWN 54% 58% DOWN30 dw/ha mark rising to a cumulative 54% below the
40 dw/ha mark, down 4% compared to 1994–1998. This
shows that whereas non-PDL is linked to low density
development there was in late 90s and early 2000s a
strengthening development model using PDL for higher
density development (high density PDL configuration).
The side effect of the trends shown in Fig. 3.2 was the
increase in the polarisation of output mainly due to the
increase in high density PDL output and decrease in low
density PDL output. Table 1 describes in more detail
how this polarisation evolved with time during the late
1990s and up to 2003. Whereas a significant percentage
of total dwelling output was produced as part of low
density developments, dwelling output in high density
developments did also increase significantly. Output in
medium density developments between 30 and 80 dw/
ha was steady on non-PDL land and was dropping on
PDL land.
Medium density PDL (30–80 dw/ha) is also an
option but was not a rapidly growing trend probably
because of its lower profitability compared to high
density PDL. The share of medium density non-PDL
during the period 1994–2003 was dropping as a
percentage of dwellings built.
Looking at the composition of output one can
observe that the percentage of newly built flats begun to
rise in 1997 following several years of sustained decline
(Fig. 3.3). Until 1997 the proportion of houses in the































Fig. 3.3. Flats as % of total private dwellings built in selected English
regions, 1990–2010.
Source: DCLG, Live tables on house building, Table 254.year to year. However, between 1997 and 2008,
increasing densities and increasing percentage of flats
built indicate a changing balance between types of
development produced. These outputs can only be
achieved by multi-storey apartment building although
there is still ample latitude in the variation of feasible
configurations of developments.
After 2008 the percentage of flats in total private
dwelling output has dropped from 46% in 2008/2009 to
30% in 2010/2011 while during the same period the
percentage of 3 and 4+ bedroom houses has risen from
46% to 60%. Given that the average density of
development has remained stable since 2004 for both
PDL and non-PDL (Fig. 3.1) it would be interesting to
explore further what the situation currently is regarding
the dwelling output per density category and type of
land used (i.e. the distribution of output between
development configurations as shown in Fig. 3.2).
Whatever the case may be it is useful to note here
that Fig. 3.3 shows the change in the composition of
output has only marginally affected London whereas it
is very apparent in many English regions. Similarly,
according to the same DCLG data, private dwelling
production in London has dropped by 22% since 2007
compared to a drop of 46% for England as a whole.
Thus in 2010/2011 London accounted for around 14%
of private dwelling production (and 17% of total
dwelling production) in England, up from 10% (and
13% respectively) in 2007/2008. The fact that one in six
dwellings in England in 2010/2011 was built in London
and around 90% of that production was flats should
have an effect in aggregate density and housebuilding
statistics for England.
As a result of the changes in government policy
related to the supply of land, housebuilding firms were
faced with a requirement to significantly change their
strategies and to develop new know-how in order to
respond to the changing circumstances of their business
environment. Not all firms interpreted that change in the
same way, nor have they responded to it similarly.
However, housebuilders are faced with limited strategic
options when faced with the constraints imposed by the
planning system in terms of land inputs. Though the
latest trends in dwelling production indicate a
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Table 2
The six land-density options open to housebuilders.
High density (>80 dw/ha) Medium density (30–80 dw/ha) Low density (<30 dw/ha)
Type of land
Non-PDL Similar to high rise layouts tried in the
1950s and 1960s. The planning
system and local NIMBYism make it
unlikely that such developments
could go ahead easily
More likely than high density non-
PDL to be accepted by LPAs and local
communities. Traditional layouts and
housebuilding construction methods
can still be used
Traditional suburban housing
developments, promoted by planning
policy until 1995 and perhaps more
acceptable again insofar as planning
policy is concerned. Generally more
acceptable by suburban and rural
local communities
PDL Financially profitable at high enough
densities. Construction methods
different to traditional housebuilding
(concrete, curtain walling etc.).
Changing social norms and policy
discourses make it more acceptable.
‘Urban chic’ marketing appealing to
certain retail customers whereas the
format is suitable for wholesale
purchases by investors
More likely to be accepted by LPAs
and local communities. Often more
efficient and profitable for
housebuilders to switch to different
methods and higher densities
An attempt to create the same
configuration of space as above using
a less advantageous type of land
(higher servicing costs, more
expensive, etc.). Difficult to capitalise
on the ‘rural idyll’ since PDL is rarely
ruralgeographical dimension to firm differentiation (London
diverging from the rest of the country), the changing
land input had significant effects on the various
‘‘structures of organisation of agency relationships’’
underlying private housebuilding and on the organisa-
tion of production (de Magalhaes, 1996).
As the use of PDL was increasing so was the
percentage of new dwellings built on PDL and the
percentage of these new dwellings that were flats. This
however also means that the built environment
produced as part of that shift had significant differences
in its configuration from the environments previously
produced. In order to produce these new configurations
of spaces the actors involved had to reconfigure the way
they organised their production processes. As the
analysis above shows, one of the most significant
changes that occurred in housebuilding is the densifica-
tion of non-PDL developments and the boost of
production in high density PDL developments of above
80 dw/ha. Following the market downturn, flat produc-
tion has disproportionately declined outside London,
raising interesting questions as to why high density
schemes would be deemed unviable whereas low
density schemes would continue to be built.
These questions however could be the inspiration for
further research in the future. The section that follows
will examine in detail the generic strategies and
practices of two top London housebuilders first
discussed in the literature in mid-2000 (Adams,
2004; Karadimitriou, 2005), the Berkeley Group andWimpey (George Wimpey prior to 2007 and Taylor
Wimpey thereafter).
4. Housebuilder decision making
The previous section argued that dwelling produc-
tion in the UK evolved towards polarisation insofar as
the types of developments produced are concerned. It
showed that following the end of the housing boom,
some housebuilders are shifting their production
towards multi bedroom houses whereas one-bedroom
flat production has declined. In the previous section, the
hypothesis was also made that the types of built
environment produced still cater for at least two
different types of demand, one for low density (mainly
on non-PDL) and the other for high density apartment
living (mainly on PDL). Apart from an apparent
geographical differentiation between London and the
rest of England, this polarisation may well reflect wider
inequalities in income distribution and associated
spending power. However in order to understand the
situation from the point of view of the housebuilding
firm it is worth looking into housebuilders’ strategic
options when it comes to the potential land type/density
mix they are faced with.
So far as the type of land used and the density of
development produced are concerned, housebuilders
have essentially six alternative ideal-type combinations
as strategic options to choose from, shown in Table 2.
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density housebuilding process, from architects and
planners to quantity surveyors and marketing experts
have become accustomed to working with this type of
land and the products that go with it. Their expertise has
developed in particular ways, institutions, norms and
routines have evolved in order to standardise the process
and increase efficiency. This specialisation has devel-
oped to such an extent that when asked if any aspects of
non-PDL housebuilding and building on PDL are
similar a senior manager of a major housebuilder said:
‘‘No, they’re not, it’s a different industry’’.
When asked how he would call the types of
development his company are building the same
interviewee stressed the differences in the element of
risk involved in PDL high density housebuilding
compared to non-PDL low density housebuilding:
It is regeneration. We are building private homes and
affordable homes in fairly close proximity and that
has risk attached to it. . .To actually build a new
community and sell expensive flats to people to
create a cross subsidy to build cheap flats and bring
poor people next door, is a risk that the rich people
might say ‘not for me thank you’. . .It is a risk having
to build commercial shell space and wait perhaps
years until anybody wants it because they are waiting
for a critical mass of population to use their shops,
their restaurants, their gymnasium or whatever.
Additionally, the change to high density PDL
development posed new challenges for the industry
with regard to the response of the planning system. In
the words of a senior manager familiar with the
planning aspects of housebuilding:
. . .the industry as a whole, suffer from the same
setback. They may achieve all of the objectives
(design, parking, density, etc.) but local authorities
do not follow government policy and stop the
implementation of the new standards. This is
reflected in the high number of appeals, council
members decide opposite of government advice.
This was at a time when government was pushing for
denser development. More recently, the introduction of
the Localism Bill (now an Act) seems to have
diversified these views. Land Securities for example
anticipates that localism will exacerbate anti-develop-
ment sentiments in urban areas like London but may
actually reduce resistance to development in more rural
areas (Land Securities, 2011). According to senior
managers from Berkeley and Wimpey interviewed for
this research, the cost of purchasing non-PDL land is amajor element of the total cost of development,
reaching 40% in some cases thus making land
speculation extremely important for overall profit-
ability. This should be compared to around 10% in high
density PDL developments, as evidenced for example
from Berkeley’s own estimates. In 2009 Berkeley’s
average dwelling sales price was £395,000 whereas
their average plot acquisition cost was £33,000 i.e. 8.3%
of the average dwelling sales price. As one interviewee
eloquently said when asked how profits are made in
high density PDL housebuilding:
We know how to work the density. Land value is a
fairly low percentage of development value and if
you are buying a green field you might pay 35% or
even 40% of the value,. . . [in a PDL]. . . it is between
5–10%, so yes, the land might be £30 million and
that is a lot of money to pay the interest on every
week. It goes through a cycle where the borrowings
might go up to £100 million but when it comes down,
if you are a long term player running a public
company and if at the same time you have another
project that started back here and has peaked and
come down here, so if you look at the bigger picture
it evens out so land values are not that significant.
This difference in percentages also reflects the
relatively moderate cost per square metre of non-PDL
housing construction and land servicing. However, it
highlights the importance of landbanking and land
management as a cost control mechanism and hints at
the potentially higher margins that housebuilders with
good landbanking skills could enjoy for upmarket non-
PDL developments, especially highly priced detached
houses. Indeed, when 30–40% of costs are land costs
then margins will be more affected by changes in this
cost element.
Thus, for Wimpey and for many other housebuilders
gaining planning permission for a site should be better
seen as a process of transferring the development rights
from the state/social sphere to the private sphere. It is a
process which, as Ball argued in 1983 and as is evident
from the paragraphs above, in the case of non-PDL
housebuilding starts with the efforts of housebuilders to
influence the planning system to designate land in
accordance with their strategic landbank holdings
during the development plan formulation process. This,
in turn, requires substantial land market know how and
planning capabilities which are usually area-specific
thus forcing housebuilders to maintain some degree of
geographical fragmentation both as individual compa-
nies and as a sector, a trait well explored by Ball (1983).
This set of skills is quite different from the negotiation
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planning system and to constantly revise it thereafter.
Government policy from the early 1990s onward had
the consequence of reducing the importance of out of
town non-PDL strategic land and strategic planning
knowledge, at least in geographical terms and for as
long as PDL land was the order of the day. By the same
token it made negotiation, consultation, partnering and
land consolidation skills more important. The cards
have been reshuffled once more following the turn
towards localism and the relaxation of government
policy towards expansion witnessed in the NPPF.
Planning negotiation skills continue to be important but
greenfield strategic landbanking capacities also gain in
significance, thus major housebuilders who wish to have
broad geographical coverage may well respond with an
increase in the variation of their approaches to
development in order to reflect the variety of their
business environment.
The point is that changes in land input require a
change in approach from developers and the planning
system alike and are eventually reflected on house-
builder landbanks and the type of dwelling output.
Partially because of the powerful sustainability dis-
course and partially because of practical, locational,
reasons, many PDL sites were allocated as potential
development sites from the Local Planning Authorities
(LPAs). PPG3 and the sequential approach had put extra
pressure on both the developers and the planning system
to promote PDL site redevelopment, whereas PPG4 and
PPG13 also tried to influence commercial development
and transport infrastructure in the same way. The
introduction of the Strategic Housing Land Availability
Assessment (SHLAA) following PPS 3 of 2006 and the
obligation of Local Authorities to satisfy stringent
housing production and land utilisation goals further
elaborated the tools aimed at regulating housing
production and land used.
Similarly, the requirements for Statements of
Community Involvement following the Planning Act
of 2004 added an important dimension to the process by
highlighting the role of community consultation prior to
any property development project. This element will be
further enhanced with the shift towards Neighbourhood
Planning which is now taking form whereas the
replacement of the PPS-RSS system with the NPPF
and the ‘duty to cooperate’ introduces an element of
greater flexibility without necessarily changing the
overall strategic goal of reinforcing sustainable urban
development (thus still promoting densification up to an
extent). What is actually going to happen insofar as
dwelling output is concerned is anyone’s guess at themoment. This ‘wait and see’ approach is reflected in the
latest annual reports of both Berkeley and Wimpey.
With regard to planning skills, there still seems to be
scope for developers of PDL to put pressure on the
planning system during the plan-making process in
order to allocate developable PDL land according to
their landbank. This ‘tweaking’ of the system however
is a crucial element in non-PDL development too
because in many cases the LPAs are rather negatively
predisposed in releasing ‘greenfield’ land, partially
reflecting pressures from local constituencies. There-
fore, the assertion by Land Securities that development
may become easier outside the big urban centres may
sound surprising at first. However, it has to be seen in
conjunction with the New Homes Bonus, which in
principle at least should provide a strong incentive for
local authorities to allow more housebuilding within
their boundaries. The shift towards ever increasing
community participation in turn makes stakeholder
engagement skills and planning gain negotiation skills
on behalf of the developer much more important. These
‘collaborative’ skills, which accommodate for the
constant change of the development’s design and mix
of uses are also essential for other actors, like the LPA
and the local community.
An interviewee involved in the planning process for
both PDL and non-PDL schemes said that although all
developers are ‘‘reasonably constructive’’, Berkeley
followed an impressive cooperative attitude quite
different from the industry standard. Berkeley them-
selves are quite aware of this and very much in favour of
the latest Localism Act requirement for pre-application
consultation. Similarly, Wimpey’s approach seems to
have changed in the years after the merger with Taylor
Woodrow and is now also recognising the importance of
consultation with LPAs and local communities. This of
course does not mean that these housebuilders will not
make use of the legal means available to them, i.e.
‘double track’ or appeal, as demonstrated by the case
studies. With that in mind, the interviews conducted as
part of the case studies indicate that the planning system
is often treated by housebuilders as a process that needs
speeding up in order to speed up the production cycle.
This ‘need for speed’ is reflected in much of the
discourse underpinning the linkup of LPA funding with
planning permission determination time and with the
constant efforts to reform the planning system with a
view to ‘speeding it up’.
PDL developers face different uncertainties when
compared to non-PDL developers. Granting develop-
ment rights on PDL should in principle face less
planning-induced resistance given that policy is in
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there are few if any established local communities in
and around most PDL sites. For example Wandsworth,
where the case studies are situated, prided itself
throughout the 2000s for being an authority with a
can-do mentality which welcomes development and
whose approach according to a person knowledgeable
of its planning approach is ‘‘to maximise the benefits of
the use of land’’.
Other than that, critical views of PDL redevelopment
emphasise the uncertainty over development coming
from the material conditions on the site itself
(contamination, existing structures requiring demoli-
tion, etc.). However, as the interviews have revealed,
these issues are of a technical nature and a manageable
risk for companies which have developed suitable
know-how. This view has been confirmed by surveys
(Shephard & Dixon, 2004) showing that technical issues
like contamination are not deterring adequately
resourced developers.
Finally, in terms of marketing the development, the
importance of attracting customers by selling a lifestyle
more than a product should not be underestimated. It
should not come as a surprise then that a new marketing
approach has been deployed to promote PDL high
density developments. The marketing of low density
developments and dwellings usually built on non-PDL
very much rotates around the ‘idyllic countryside
living’/’escape the city evils’ theme. The way the urban
renaissance/sustainable community discourse was
expressed in the greenfields vs. brownfields dichotomy
increased the difficulty of successfully marketing
developments on PDL based on the ‘rural idyll’
marketing model.
The lifestyle sold with an urban PDL high density
development therefore contrasts sharply to the lifestyle
sold with a low density development, either PDL or
more often non-PDL. In urban PDL developments
priority is given in promoting the image of the ‘trendy’,
‘urban chic’ and ‘vibrant’ character of city living.
Images of young, dynamic (often single) and trendy
individuals are evoked to promote the ‘aspirational
status’ of the clientele. The architectural and design
features of the buildings are contemporary as opposed
to the traditionalist features of low density non-PDL
‘rural idyll’ housing. This target group usually has
enough disposable income to pay for the prices that this
strategy of product differentiation entails.
From the discussion and the analysis thus far it
emerges that during the last dozen or so years, housing
provision in the UK went through an ‘adaptation’ phase.
Non-PDL land used for housebuilding in 2009 was 31%of the total land used for housebuilding (down from
54% in 1994) and in 2010 the percentage of new
dwellings built on PDL stood at 76%, down from 80%
in 2009 but up from 54% in 1994. This change in the
type of land used had an important effect on the types
of dwellings produced. The higher the percentage of
newly built dwellings on PDL the higher the
percentage of these new dwellings that are flats.
More flats meant more apartment blocks which in
turn implied denser development formats. At the
same time, total non-PDL land consumption was
dropping. Until 2007 this could be attributed to the
turn away from land-intensive non-PDL development,
thereafter it is also associated with the overall
collapse of housing production and the densification
of non-PDL development. Production output has not
recovered since and in all likelihood it will not
recover substantially until the current property market
conundrum is resolved.
This trend towards densification had an effect on the
generic skills required for success in housebuilding so
far as PDL is concerned. The locational and qualitative
requirements of PDL housebuilding require the
restructuring of existing landbanks and incur an
opportunity cost and actual resource commitment on
behalf of housebuilders. Shifting the composition of
landbanks once more towards more non-PDL sites in
response to the requirements of localism would have a
similar effect although it may well be the case that
several housebuilders never really restructured their
strategic non-PDL landbanks. At the same time,
effective partnership-building and negotiation skills
continue to grow in importance due to the long term
involvement that non-PDL development requires from
housebuilders. Long term involvement within an
uncertain post credit-crunch environment also
increases the importance of s.106 agreements or any
other value extraction arrangement (CIL, etc.). Market-
ing is also dramatically affected. Selling lower density
non-PDL developments is based on the ‘rural idyll’
ideal whereas high density PDL developments, or at
least their urban variant, are sold on the merits of the
‘urban lifestyle’.
The following section will examine how Berkeley
and Wimpey had to adapt to the changes in policy
regime that started in the mid 1990s and the way
the two companies weathered the crisis of the late
2000s. It will do so by looking at their strategic
response to policy change, their norms, routines
and skills at the operational level and at the
performance of each company throughout the period
in question.
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The previous section illuminated some of the
changes shaping the industry at the aggregate output
level and argued that there is a link between the changes
in planning policy and the significant changes occurring
in the types of dwellings produced and in the built
environment thus created. This section will focus on the
firm and on the development site level and will explore
how the transformation of the end product is linked to a
process of strategic adaptation by two major house-
builders to the new business environment.
Depending on the timescale and the type of response
of each firm, this reorientation affected their compe-
titive position which in turn affected their present and
future profitability and their chances of survival and
growth. Residential development is a business activity
involving high degrees of uncertainty. There are
uncertainties about the future market, consumer
preferences, economic and fiscal policy, product
construction and specification to name just a few.
Firms can be short-sighted in the sense that they cannot
fully anticipate the consequences of their actions let
alone the shape and form of their future business
environment. This section will look at some of the ways
in which the two housebuilders organised themselves in
view of this uncertain business environment.
5.1. Berkeley and Chelsea Bridge Wharf
5.1.1. The Berkeley approach
In the case of the Berkeley Group, market
uncertainty is managed through a flexible approach
towards the planning and design of the product (i.e. mix
variation, change in specification) made possible
through a highly developed construction management
approach that relies on inputs from a market feedback
mechanism. This market feedback mechanism com-
bines information about demand and supply conditions
in different markets (retail, housing, office, leisure, etc.)
but also what the characteristics of that demand are i.e.
which types of products are more sought after. In that
respect information from other divisions (i.e. Berkeley
Commercial) is crucial as well as information from
forward selling.
According to Tony Pidgley, MD of the Berkeley
Group, the Group is in the business of ‘‘. . .adding value
to land, through the application of our development
skills’’ (Berkeley Group, 1992, p. 4). The process of
land development and thus of adding value to land is
split by Pidgley into five ‘functions’: land acquisition and use optimisation,
 planning permission,
 design of product,
 construction,
 marketing and sales.
These functions are treated as a constantly evolving
process and therefore they are only separated here for
analytical reasons. Site selection and acquisition are
market-driven in the sense that local land acquisition
teams try to verify whether a site has the potential to suit
the needs of customers. Depending on the area that
potential may derive from good schools, amenities,
shopping opportunities, etc. Therefore, decentralised
land acquisition by teams with excellent local
knowledge is essential.
The following quote from Berkeley’s 2010 annual
report (p. 4) summarises their approach and has been
reaffirmed in several interviews:
Maintaining our operating margin above 17% is a
result of Berkeley’s strategy where land buying is
highly selective – driven by opportunity not volume
– and where Berkeley has the time and expertise to
add value to its land holdings.
A manager with deep knowledge of the practices
of the Berkeley Group suggested that indeed what
matters for the group is not how long a site stays in its
possession but how much value is added by the
company during the time that the site stays in its
possession. In general, he added, Berkeley is ‘‘not
intimidated’’ by holding sites for a long period and
takes the time ‘‘to get most out of the site’’. This
statement reflects the attitude and the level of
specialisation required by the very nature of the
business that Berkeley is involved in: in 2004 the
company withdrew from all non-PDL housebuilding
and thereafter focused solely on ‘large scale complex
regeneration’. This was combined with a share
buyback scheme which in effect would increase the
control of the management team over company affairs
whilst returning significant amounts of capital (£12
per share) to shareholders within seven years (up to
2011). In 2008 and in view of deteriorating market
conditions the company’s AGM decided to defer the
last payment of £3 to 2014 and instead use the funds
for land purchases. One year later, the company
focused even more on land purchases to be funded
through an increase in share capital, the goal to return
£3 by 2014 was abandoned in consultation with the
shareholders.
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skilled in development. Their skill base ranges from
surveying, to planning, to design, to marketing and they
work together on a site from beginning to end even
when external expertise is brought in. These ‘multi-
skilled’ teams not only manage the uncertainty of the
construction process but also facilitate a more flexible
approach to the design and the specification of the final
product. Customer input can be used from the very
beginning in combination with ‘forward selling’
practices. When Lai, Wang, and Zhou (2004) looked
into techniques that can be employed to manage the
uncertainties arising from the unpredictability of future
demand they argued that:
. . .the presale method not only helps developers deal
with the uncertainty of future demand. . .but can also
substantially reduce developer’s inventory costs. . .
This method is particularly useful for large
development projects. . .
In Berkeley developments, the layout of the flats or
houses can be revised even at a late stage during the
development process, to accommodate for changing
market conditions and customer requirements. Accord-
ing to several interviewees, profit making through land
trading was not within the strategic priorities of the
company but emphasis was put on adding value to land
through development. In post-2007 company annual
reports, however, increased emphasis is placed on
landbanking and indeed, as mentioned previously, the
whole corporate strategy shifted in order to channel
company resourses into land acquisitions.
Typically, in order to minimise market risk and
improve cash flow and returns on their invested
capital, housebuilders would aim at minimising the
time that lapses between taking the decision to
develop and selling the final product, their frequently
aired dissatisfaction  with the ‘slow’ planning applica-
tion process testifies to how crucial the time
parameter is. However, volume production of large,
apartment block developments on PDL which are
more complex in terms of design, planning and
construction poses a significant challenge in terms of
turnover time. Additionally, by virtue of their size,
these developments can form a substantial part of a
housebuilder’s annual output thus increasing the
exposure of the balance sheet to market risks. Flats
in apartment blocks are difficult to occupy while the
block is under construction. Thus, high density
apartment block developments can potentially make
housebuilders more vulnerable to changes in market
conditions compared to traditional low densityhousing developments. Flexibility in the practices
employed towards the timing of sales is key in
tackling the risks that come with this new business
reality. Therefore one way to release part of the block
for sale earlier in the process is to engage in forward
selling.
Forward selling is often used as a way to decrease the
cash flow imbalances that typify speculative house-
building. However, forward selling not only allows for a
more balanced cash flow but also acts as an insight into
market demand. This information, combined with sales
information from the rest of the Group can be then
translated into quantitative and qualitative alterations in
supply and thus make it more responsive to fluctuations
in demand. Finally, another big advantage of forward
selling is that it allows the company to start work on the
site ‘‘as soon as possible’’ but at the same time to be
responsive to the demands of the clients by incorporat-
ing their preferences into the product. The developer is
thus living up to the marketing strategy by selling a
personalised product for which it can attract higher
premiums. Although today forward sales are a practice
widespread throughout the industry, the integration of
the practice into the production process as well as the
extent that this practice is used at Berkeley are
exceptional. Indicatively, in 2003 ‘cash due on forward
sales’ was £920.9 million compared with total sales per
year of £1130.1 million (Perrins, 2003) whereas in 2007
forward sales amounted to £936.3 million compared to
total revenue of £918.4 million (Berkeley Group, 2007)
and in 2010 the cash due on forward sales was £648.1
million with total revenue for the year standing at
£615.3 million (Berkeley Group, 2010).
Apart from forward selling, phasing is another
important practice which aims at managing risk and
profitably exploiting market fluctuations. When they
looked into the benefits of mixed use schemes Childs,
Riddiough, and Triantis (1996) concluded that they are
useful in mitigating risks when tapping into uncorre-
lated markets and in adding economic value by pushing
marginal revenues up when market oversupply in one
type of use would otherwise have forced them down for
any specific development. Depending on the efficiency
of the construction process and the prevailing market
conditions the size of each phase can vary from a few
dozen units (one block of flats) to a couple of hundred
units (several blocks of flats forming a neighbourhood).
Thus production can be regulated and market risk can be
controlled without compromising the long term
completion of the whole development. The type, size
and style of the apartments produced and eventually the
market segment that each batch will be sold to are also
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methods (shell and core, fasttrack) the size and
configuration of each batch of flats can be adjusted
to suit market demand and the style of the apartments
can be modified to fit the buyer’s tastes and require-
ments.
One way to operationalise the mix of uses as a
market risk management tool is to obtain a planning
permission for a specific mix of uses but change this
mix during the project’s lifetime by submitting new
applications. A variant of this approach is to obtain an
outline planning permission which allows certain uses
to expand or contract in terms of square metres but
only within a pre-set band (so they cannot drop below
a minimum and cannot rise above a maximum size).
Therefore, under this approach, what was envisaged
as a hotel in the original planning application may
become an office block or an apartment block at a
later stage and the total surface of each use may also
change. Site planning and design become a unique
process: sites are constantly  re-planned with the aim
of increasing densities ‘‘. . .whenever appropriate in
line with best planning practice’’ (Berkeley Group,
2003, p. 9). This allows the company to increase
output and profitability without additional land costs.
This is by no means a practice unique to the Berkeley
Group. A similar approach was taken for example in
King’s Cross where the outline planning permission
defined the mix of uses in terms of a possible
range of coverage that each use could occupy in the
future. The way that arrangement would play out in
practice was actually one of the main points of public
concern during the Planning Committee meetings
where the King’s Cross Central development was
discussed.
Change in the mix of uses combined with forward
selling, flexible construction methods and appropriate
phasing is a risk management approach comparable to
the ‘stop-go’ approach used by traditional house-
builders and has the advantage that it potentially
smoothens the cyclical variations in output. In the case
of Berkeley it is complemented by collaborative
working in multiskilled teams and often by a
cooperative approach towards other stakeholders. When
put together this set of practices could be called ‘the
development management’ approach.
In summary, the main features of this approach
include:
 Engaging in discussions with the planning authority
early on, when the ideas about the project are still
developing. Using multiskilled teams to tackle each site and
keeping the same team involved throughout the
process.
 Allowing planning, design and construction to
overlap or run simultaneously instead of treating
them in sequence to each other.
 Separating the development in autonomous phases;
each phase could be built by a different contractor,
under the supervision of the developer and its
construction management consultant who coordinates
the process.
 Varying the product mix for each phase based on the
feedback from other corporate divisions and sales as
well as forward selling.
 Approaching urban planning as an open-ended
process linked to a constantly evolving scheme.
Elements of the ‘fasttrack’ construction method
appropriately adapted to the UK context and to the
particular circumstances of PDL redevelopment can
also be used. Therefore, the overlap between planning,
design and construction is combined with customer
input and sales figures to allow appropriate modifica-
tions to each project phase even during its construction.
This method is radically different to alternatives like the
‘Design & Build’ procurement but requires a much
greater coordination effort. The outcome, however, is a
build up of organisational capacity to manage effec-
tively the uncertainties surrounding big, long term and
complex projects.
5.1.2. Berkeley’s adaptation to policy changes
It is worth pointing out here that the strategic
transition towards more PDL development was a
gradual process of learning and adaptation for Berkeley.
Given the government’s policy focus the redevelopment
of brownfield sites was seen as a move that would allow
the group to exploit opportunities for future growth. The
company gradually moved from its original identity as a
builder focused on upmarket suburban housing (late
1980s–early 1990s) to large scale upmarket mixed use
urban PDL developments, basing its business strategy
on product differentiation.
The Group’s transformation was neither sudden nor
immediate but required long term commitment. The
1998–2001 period was a period of reorganisation for the
group, as the 1999 annual report (Berkeley Group,
2000, p. 3) recognises:
The year has been a challenging one in terms of
production. A growing number of the Group’s
projects are on brownfield urban sites which are
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management teams in place with the right procedures
and controls to deliver the finished units to the right
timescale and costs. During the year Tony K. Pidgley
has undertaken a review of the structure necessary to
successfully manage the wide range and volume of
developments undertaken by the Berkeley Homes
companies. Accordingly, those companies have now
been reorganised to ensure that our management
teams, skills and expertise align more closely to the
types of developments undertaken.
It seems that 1999 was a critical year in that process,
which started in the early 1990s when Berkeley
participated in the development of Brindley Place.
That year’s company report (Berkeley Group, 1999, p.
3) recognises that and also identifies a crucial element
of the Group’s approach towards redevelopment, the
strict control over the development process.
A growing number of the Group’s projects are on
brownfield urban sites which are more technically
demanding thus requiring the right management teams
in place with the right procedures and controls to deliver
the finished units to the right timescale and costs.
During that year the Group was restructured to
‘‘. . .align more closely to the types of developments
undertaken’’ (Berkeley Group, 1999, p. 3). It seems that
around that time the company realised that its future lay
in urban PDL redevelopment, mostly in the inner city
rather than the leafy suburbs. The following quote from
the 1999 annual report is a good example of how
Berkeley positioned itself in a broader business
environment which the change in government policy
was reshaping.
Our strategy was based on the fact that our
development skills and expertise lent themselves
most readily to expanding into city and town centres
where we could concentrate on urban and brownfield
schemes. This has proved very successful. Land
supply is a key element of our business and obtaining
the right planning permission within the right
timescales is essential.
The Government has made it clear that it wants to see
60% of the new housing supply built on recycled or
brownfield sites. These are precisely the sites on
which the Berkeley Group is now concentrating and
where it has acquired particular expertise. At the
same time, the implosion back into city and town
centres where people now enjoy living and want to
buy their homes has generated an active and readymarket for our products. Over the last few years, the
Group has become skilled at developing complicated
inner-city and town centre sites. Although these sites
are not without their complications and frustrations,
we believe that this expertise and understanding of
the issues will contribute markedly to our future
growth (Berkeley Group, 1999, p. 5).
However, several years after beginning its shift, the
Berkeley Group still retained some production of
executive suburban development as a residual activity.
Its 2003 annual report vowed to ‘‘. . .remain committed
to undertaking today’s most exciting and challenging
urban regeneration and renaissance projects’’ (Berkeley
Group, 2003) and the same strong commitment appears
to all annual reports up to 2010 whereby the policy
uncertainty coming with the change in government
seems to have led the company to tone down its
references to regeneration whilst retaining the emphasis
on sustainable community building.
The strategic review of 2003 led to the virtual
abandonment of non-PDL housebuilding and regional
activities thus leading to the divestment of Crosby
Homes, the closure of Thirlstone and the withdrawal of
Berkeley Homes from greenfield development. This
major strategic re-orientation continued into 2004 with
a proposal from the Board to phase out non-PDL
housebuilding, scale down the business and gradually
buy out existing institutional investor stakes to turn a
group with a market capitalisation of £1.4 billion into a
specialised housebuilder with a market capitalisation of
about £500 million. After the restructuring, which was
cut short following the 2007 downturn, Tony Pidgley
together with three more directors owned a bigger
percentage of the new company (the aim was for 15%).
The following excerpt from the press release announ-
cing the restructuring plan illustrates the unique
characteristics of Berkeley and the important elements
of the business model of the group. It also sums up the
rationale underlying the processes of strategic adapta-
tion that Berkeley has followed for the last two and a
half decades, a rationale which is consistently
transformed into action to the extent that this research
could explore.
Berkeley operates a different business model to the
majority of other house-builders as it concentrates
mainly on highly complex, large-scale, inner-city,
urban regeneration schemes on brownfield land
where it can create enhanced returns for Share-
holders and deliver benefits for all stakeholders. The
strategic review. . . sought to assess the best route for
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3 In the case of the Berkeley Group these profits include profits from
activities outside the UK which are minimal as well as non house-
building activities.delivering shareholder value. This took place in the
context of the Board’s views about the outlook for
achieving sustainable growth in the markets in which
it operates – where there appears to be a natural size
for a residential urban regenerator – and takes into
account the normalisation of the housing market
following a decade of boom and a number of other
external factors.
The Board considered a number of strategic options
including continuing to grow the business, which
required further investment and additional manage-
ment teams, disposing of the business or selling-off
or demerging individual divisions. . .After careful
consideration the Board has decided to leave behind
Berkeley’s traditional housebuilding heritage and
focus primarily on larger scale complex regenera-
tion. This strategy allows the return of substantial
capital to Shareholders while enabling Berkeley to
continue to buy land selectively when attractive
opportunities arise in the urban regeneration market.
Critically, it is a path that will retain staff to ensure
the sustainability and future of the business with the
main challenge now being to realise the value
contained within Berkeley’s strong land bank.
This reorganisation not only sacrificed non-PDL
housebuilding and wider scope and geographical cover-
age in favour of a more specialised company but also set
the company on course for a management buyback of its
shares. Reduced influence from the City had the
advantage that it allowed the company to focus on the
long term and on activities that the management believed
it did best. That review also led to a renewed emphasis on
other activities (affordable housing, commercial prop-
erty, strategic land) that blended better with the business
model and were highlighted as future growth areas.
As it turns out, the capacities to engage in affordable
housing and in strategic land purchases where important
in reducing the effects of the 2007 property market
downturn on output, cashflow and profitability. How-
ever, Berkeley as most other housebuilders adopted a
‘wait and see’ approach following the change in
government in 2010. Since then its annual reports
emphasise concepts like sustainability and community
consultation and tone down the emphasis on regenera-
tion and PDL development.
5.1.3. Berkeley’s performance
The outcome of this long term strategic approach to
development is that the company first grew at a dramatic
pace and then managed to survive and stay profitableeven during the downturn. Its output and turnover were
increasing steadily prior to the downturn, its profit
margins (ranging from 17% to over 20%) were steadily
on or above the industry average. It did not engage in
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in order to maintain
or increase market share or gain skills or assets. The
evolution of the group is ‘organic’, based on sound
financial practices, efficient operations and strategic
vision that allows it to tap early on into emerging
markets. Today, the company specialises in upmarket,
high margin, mixed use developments in prominent
locations and thus is active in relatively few markets
(geographically).
The industry ‘league tables’ from EmapGlenigan/
Housebuilder magazine show that already in 2003, the
Berkeley Group was the top housebuilder company in
London, based on applications to build, followed by a
distant second Wimpey (Menary, 2003). In comparison,
for the UK where the competition could build on non-
PDL, Berkeley came behind Wimpey, Barratt, Persim-
mon and Taylor Woodrow, despite its limited geo-
graphic coverage (Wellings, 2002). The Glenigan/
Housebuilder magazine league table for 2011 shows
that in effect Berkeley has become an oligopoly in
London but has withdrawn from all other markets
except from the South East. Out of a total of 6912 units
for London as a whole, Berkeley had submitted detailed
plans for developments totalling 3989 units followed by
a long second Asprey, with 480 units, and Barratt in
third spot with 223 units (Menary, 2011). In the rest of
the UK it is Persimmon, Taylor Wimpey, Barratt and
Bellway who are leading the tables.
Since the 1989–1991 market downturn, which
caused a temporary slump in profits and turnover and
up to 2004, Berkeley has gone from strength to strength.
It has consistently posted double digit rates of annual
turnover and profit growth3 with one exception in 1991
which can be attributed to the adverse market conditions
at the time. It is characteristic that in 1992 its profits
from housebuilding soared by 5153.7% compared to
1991 (Fig. 5.1).
However, even in 1989–1991 and 2007–2010 the
company remained profitable while its competitors
were facing losses (see the following section on
Wimpey) (Fig. 5.2).
Apart from years when crises strike the only other
years where profits from housebuilding declined
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Fig. 5.3. Berkeley Group, nr of units sold and year on year change,
1984–2010.



























Fig. 5.1. Berkeley Group, annual turnover and profits 1984–2010.
Source: Selected company annual reports 1984–2010.compared to the years before were 2000 and 2004–
2005. Interestingly enough, profit margins have been on
the rise throughout the last 20 years and have remained
above industry average even during the latest market
downturn. In 2000 a slightly higher percentage of the
group’s profits came from commercial developments, in
mixed-use schemes. In 2004 it was the Joint Venture
activity (which included some Social Housing schemes)
that acted as a buffer, although the group’s performance
in 2005 was affected to a large extent by the decision to
totally withdraw from non-PDL housebuilding by
selling Crosby Homes to Lend Lease and at the same
time to adopt new accounting standards.
In a mature business sector, like housebuilding,
persistently high margins are a strong indication that the
company’s growth is not just an outcome of the buoyant
property market but has to do with inherently efficient
operations and good corporate capacity to tap into in
high-margin markets via processes of strategic adapta-
tion. A review of the corporate accounts, an example is
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Fig. 5.2. Berkeley Group, nominal changes in turnover, profit and
profit margin, 1984–2010.
Source: Selected company annual reports 1984–2010.efficiency is a consideration but not what drives
business strategy. It has to be noted here that this
exceptional financial performance is accompanied by
an equally impressive housing sales record, which
however has some ‘bad’ years, coinciding with adverse
market conditions and/or periods of corporate restruc-
turing (Fig. 5.3).
This performance points that the company, through
its strategic orientation and its organisation of the
production process has differentiated its product enough
to create what in effect is its own market and is
exploiting its dominant position accordingly. How this
was done will be further illuminated in the pages that
immediately follow.
5.1.4. Berkeley in action: Chelsea Bridge Wharf
Bearing in mind Barlow’s comment that housing
‘‘. . .remains an essentially mass produced product,
manufactured by using craft skills’’ (Barlow, 1999, p.
25) one can see in the preceding sections how the shift
towards high density PDL developments created the
preconditions for radically changing the way the built
environment was produced. Although because of the
nature of its methodology this research cannot comment
on industry-wide trends in terms of production methods,
it has uncovered substantial evidence that Berkeley
changed the types of dwellings they were producing as
well as the way they were producing them. This case
study will explain this ‘way of doing things’ in more
detail and will demonstrate how it was applied during
the development of a specific scheme. The case study
project, Chelsea Bridge Wharf, is a typical example of a
Berkeley Homes approach. It is a large (approximately
900-unit), multi-phased, high density, mixed use
development scheme which took a more than a decade
to complete (starting from the first planning application
submission in 1999). In other words it offers a good
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Picture 1. Northern view of Chelsea Bridge Wharf.
Source: Author.insight into the workings of Berkeley’s ‘development
management’.
The 3.5 ha site, lies between the Battersea Power
Station site and Battersea Park. It was created by joining
Battersea Wharf, Spicer Cowan Wharf and the space
underneath the railway arches that was lying between
the two. It has a 300 m river frontage, is inside the
Battersea Park Conservation Area and was a site with
contamination hotspots dating back to the days when it
was used by the railways and as a wharf. The three
constituent sites were bought outright by Berkeley
Homes in 1999. The owner was in receivership and this
was the only route left open by the receivers (Price
Waterhouse Coopers). This in turn meant that the
developer was faced with the uncertainty of the Local
Planning Authority refusing permission. However the
early engagement with the LPA and the substantial
know-how in planning negotiations allowed for this
uncertainty to be managed.
The first proposals put forward in 1999 by Berkeley
envisaged a ‘Corbusian’ layout for the site, as one
interviewee put it. In any case, following consultation
with the Local Planning Authority (London Borough of
Wandsworth) and CABE the plans were revised to form
a continuous urban frontage along the side of Battersea
Park and along the railway lines (Picture 1). This was
done in order to maintain the urban form and the ‘feel’
of the area and to provide more coherent public space at
the central core of the scheme. This revision process
resulted in a less iconic scheme but of equally high
density, with an initial plot ratio of 2.3:1 reflecting in
part the willingness of the Local Planning Authority to
promote development in the Borough. Contamination
was not viewed as an insurmountable obstacle in spite
of the important hotspots that existed on the site, it was
seen as a manageable risk.
Following this preliminary negotiation process,
which involved the submission and subsequent with-
drawal of a planning permission, Berkeley applied for
planning permission again in 2000, using ‘double
tracking’,4 for a mixed use development of 608
dwellings, a health club of 3500 m2, 8500 m2 of office
space, 370 m2 of retail space and a 235 bed 4 hotel.
The density of the proposed development stood at 173
dwellings per hectare, the buildings would reach 114 Double tracking’ means that the developer submitted the same
application twice simultaneously. In that case, if one application does
not get planning permission and an appeal is launched there is still one
application to be determined by the LPA which means that negotia-
tions can continue while the appeal is pending.storeys and would have several basement levels.
Although double tracking is usually confrontational,
in this case it was not seen as such by the Local Planning
Authority who, in the words of an interviewee,
‘‘understood’’ the rationale behind it, evidencing good
rapport between planners and developers. The proposal
was granted planning permission.
This understanding seems to have been put to the test
in 2005 when Berkeley’s proposal to change the mix of
uses for the last phase of the development was opposed
by the LPA mainly due to concerns that the develop-
ment would lose most of its employment space in favour
of housing. Eventually, Berkeley’s application was
approved on appeal. Other than that, objections to the
development were limited throughout the period it took
for the scheme to come to fruition since, as an
interviewee said, ‘‘there was no local community to
upset and have them object or make petitions’’. Despite
some criticism about the relationship of the develop-
ment to the river there was a limited number of
objection letters whenever Berkeley applied for
permission to develop a phase.
A special business unit (Chelsea Bridge Wharf Ltd.)
with an overdraft facility with Berkeley Homes and thus
with the Berkeley Group was set up to develop the site.
Chelsea Bridge Wharf Ltd. operates autonomously and
has full control over the development whereas Berkeley
Homes plays a key role in financing the development.
The project is self-financed; the initial outlay is repaid
through sales revenue. This practice limits the Group’s
capacity to expand production but implies commitment
on behalf of the Berkley Group and depends crucially
on central fiscal control in order to balance out the cash
flows from various projects and create an overall
positive return on the capital invested. The benefits of
this system of financing, which depends on equity and
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Table 3















608 (152) 173 197 382 29 235 beds 2800 3500 370 8490
Situation 2004 723 206 n.av. n.av. n.av. 438 beds Smaller but m2 n.av. 3500 370 Smaller but m2 n.av.
Situation 2010 880 257 n.av n.av n.av 213 beds 1500 800 3400 4000forward selling whilst allows gearing only when there is
increased certainty about future cash flows are reflected
in the Berkeley Group’s low gearing ratio (13.5% in
2003 and below 1% in 2008) which made it less
vulnerable to interest rate fluctuations and to the credit
crunch that ensued.
Following purchase, the same multidisciplinary
team which also included people familiar with the
commercial aspects and sales, works in close colla-
boration with planning and architecture consultants to
apply for planning permission. Berkeley Homes was
directly involved in the negotiations for permission and
planning gain. After permission was granted Chelsea
Bridge Wharf Ltd. (i.e. Berkeley) sought to change it on
several occasions in order to fit market conditions
better. At least 60 applications for all sorts of
alterations, modifications or additions to the original
submission, some of them quite substantial,  were
submitted during the decade that it took to complete the
development. For example the development started
with 608 units planned but this number later rose to 723,
then reached 842 and eventually exceeded 880 units
(Table 3).
The interviews revealed that Berkeley teams start
working on a site by formulating a general idea of what
the development should be like (size, etc.). Each team
member argues on ‘what will not or will not work’ from
their point of view. This way responsibility is shared
between team members but also the various aspects of
the development that could generate uncertainties
at later stages are tackled. This inter-departmental
approach covers all aspects of the project, an example is
apartment layout which is constantly changed in this
early stage until, in the words of an interviewee involved
in the process, ‘‘it felt right’’. The team that designed
Chelsea Bridge Wharf realised that part of what they do
would be tentative, in fact the notion of ‘getting it right
from the start’ was doubted altogether. Everyone
involved in a development team is encouraged to
constantly look into and review projects instead of
trying to fix something from the start (as the JCT Design
& Build would require).Several interviewees pointed out that what is sold in
residential sales is not property but a lifestyle. High
quality construction is therefore a priority but more
importantly, emphasis is put on fulfilling buyers’
aspirations for a unique lifestyle captured in the ‘luxury
inner city apartment’ ideal. Individuality and character
are the most important features in that respect,
satisfying substantial but latent customer demand
(Barlow, 2000). The capacity to customise Chelsea
Bridge Wharf is the outcome of a flexible design and
construction process. The approach is very similar to the
‘Fasttrack’ construction method based on concurrent
time scheduling and overlapping production elements.
The big risk with this method comes from the effort
required to coordinate the process, maintain quality and
avoid or resolve conflicts. To mitigate this risk, the
teams within Chelsea Bridge Wharf Ltd. bring together
company experts and occasionally consultants and try to
find how they can make the most of the site, the
apartment, etc. This means that the site design is an
iterative process that follows a learning curve.
This constant re-think of the scheme is a key aspect
of the Berkeley approach to development. Because of
the scale and the nature of the project at Chelsea Bridge
Wharf the developer had to stay involved in it for at least
a decade although this is a project that is average in size,
for Berkeley’s standards at least. The strength and the
nature of future demand is probably the most important
uncertainty factor in development. Usually developers
try to create developments that will suit the nature of
demand at the time the project is conceived. The
original scheme therefore is a reflection of the
developer’s perception of ‘what will sell’. This
perception might be accurate to various degrees. But
it is almost impossible to successfully forecast demand
at every stage for a project that takes the best part of a
decade from inception to completion.
In such schemes, responsiveness to the changing
nature and strength of demand is imperative. The
development and consumption phases have to be
articulated in a way that would ensure profitability or
at least survival. Four factors can ensure this flexibility:
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Fig. 5.4. The interlocking stages of development in Chelsea Bridge
Wharf.appropriate phasing between and within elements,
ability to quickly change the type of products offered,
ability to manage this change profitably and a corporate
culture that accepts change as a natural state of affairs.
This flexibility at the site level is a result of the
flexible product development. As already discussed
previously, the layout and design of the apartments are
discussed in multidisciplinary design teams and are
continuously re-worked ‘‘until it feels right’’ which
implies a process that only ends when the last batch of
apartments is constructed (Fig. 5.4). As a result the
development is treated flexibly. This flexibility allowed
Chelsea Bridge Wharf Ltd. to
 adjust the development’s mix of uses during the
development phase;
 ‘personalise’ the product (apartments).
Thus it was possible to sell a product bundle
emphasising high quality, trendy, personalised, fash-
ionable, stylish, ‘urban’ lifestyle. Interestingly the
leasehold on a long lease ownership arrangement is
another factor adding value to the development. The
freehold for the whole development is sold to one
investor who then becomes responsible for the
maintenance of the whole development through a
specialist agency. This in turn deals with a potential
problem with the management of apartment block
schemes where fragmented freehold ownership makes
the maintenance of the building more complicated and
in some cases impossible. This arrangement not only
lifts that uncertainty, thus increasing the saleability of
the properties, it is also an important factor in gaining
planning permission and successfully negotiating the
s.106 agreement.
Typically for development and construction
methods based on concurrency, Berkeley’s develop-
ment approach requires very effective coordination andcontrol mechanisms since the project is treated as a
constantly evolving process which yields different
outcomes as time progresses. Berkeley’s approach is
dealing with the uncertainties of development by
increasing the quantity and flow of information both
internally but also between the organisation and the
external environment at all stages of development.
Furthermore, it requires substantial coordination effort
to allow these phases to overlap and thus benefit from
the increased synergies that these overlaps allow. If
successful, this approach maximises the ability of the
company to respond to market fluctuations by modify-
ing the mix of uses, the style, type and size of the
apartments or the specifications of whatever space it is
creating. At the same time, phasing allows parts of the
development to be occupied whilst other parts are still
under construction.
Chelsea Bridge Wharf is a characteristic mixed use
high density development project similar in size and
type to many others that Berkeley undertakes. Its
approximately 900 units make it a big project by any
standards but the Berkeley Group is involved in similar
projects of 1200+ units, thus although it is a typical
example in a uniquely marketable location it is by no
means the biggest or most complex project currently
undertaken by Berkeley. Having said this, Berkley itself
recognises that their approach is not scalable and thus
there are limits to the company’s growth. These limits
are imposed by organisational factors which determine
a workable balance between devolution to autonomous
teams and central management control and less by the
intricacies of the development process itself.
5.2. Wimpey and Falcon Wharf
5.2.1. The Wimpey approach
Wimpey followed a rather standard approach to
development, trying to minimise turnover time. Profit-
ability was based on the ability to secure suitable sites
then get planning permission as quickly as possible,
market and sell the houses and finally transform the
income into new land purchase to start the cycle all over
again. At the same time, strategic landbanking offered
the company an edge over its competitors not only in
securing a steady flow of land but also in profiting from
land appreciation. Strategic land and strategic planning
capabilities were given prime importance and were very
well developed.
George Wimpey had, as Taylor Wimpey still has, its
own network of land managers who were looking for
sites and the group only partially depended on agents
and land owners coming to them. Each business unit had
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financial issues were dealt with centrally.
The Group financed its operations through a
combination of retained profits, bank loans, and long
term loans in the form of US$ private placements with a
group of US insurance companies. All loans were raised
centrally by the Group’s Treasury Department (George
Wimpey Plc, 2001, p. 19).
Therefore, business units were able to analyse local
circumstances quickly (planning conditions, UDP
allocations, etc.) and rapidly locate and acquire or
secure sites that satisfied a stringent set of conditions
(well-located, etc.). The exception to this approach was
George Wimpey City a unit specialising in ‘the high rise
market’ which solely relied on offers because it was
new and small and had not managed to establish the type
of know-how and networks required for a proactive
landbanking approach. The company was faced with
teething problems and in 2006 the decision was taken
for George Wimpey to exit ‘the high-rise market’.
The understanding of the development process as a
process of adding value to land (and monetising as
much as possible of it) is not uncommon in the
housebuilding industry and the Wimpey managers who
were interviewed shared that view. Interestingly
however, at the same time that Berkeley was going
down the regeneration route, a senior manager familiar
with Wimpey’s landbanking strategy felt that PDL in
their landbanks was creating problems. In response to a
question regarding Laing Homes (a company focused
on high-end customers with 90% brownfield sites in
their portfolio which Wimpey acquired in November
2002) an interviewee with good knowledge of
Wimpey’s practices said: ‘Their (i.e. Laing’s) landbank
is not entirely hopeless’.
In 2004 however, David Livingstone (Wimpey’s
Divisional MD for Laing) acknowledged in a presenta-
tion to visiting analysts that Laing’s landbank contained
sites at ‘‘better locations with larger plots’’ and that
Laing was delivering a ‘‘premium product driven by
local management’’ which focused on higher specifica-
tion and high quality design (Livinsgtone, 2004). In his
view Laing’s equivalent in the automotive industry was
Audi and Wimpey’s equivalent was VW.
Although Laing’s business model was not explored
further as part of this research its focus sounds very
similar to what Berkeley was focusing on at the same
period, thus the way Wimpey managers saw Laing’s
practices highlights the differences between two
different approaches to housebuilding. When it came
to presenting the advantages from the merger,
Livingstone pointed out that Laing had issues withcontrolling costs and therefore Laing should withdraw
from high end markets. In his view Laing could benefit
from ‘‘Margin improvement through ‘sweating’ over-
heads and build cost efficiency’’ and ‘‘benchmarking
and build cost reduction programmes’’ whilst Wimpey
could learn more from Laing’s ‘‘land consultation and
PR’’ capabilities. ‘‘Improving land purchase terms’’,
‘‘working out poor historical sites’’ and ‘‘improving the
land bank’’ through sharing large sites and ‘‘better cash
management’’ where also mentioned as interim goals
following the merger. What all this points to is the
emphasis Wimpey placed on efficiency gains through
asset sweating and cost control (competition for the
present, see Section 2), considered by Wimpey to be a
weak spot in the way Laing was doing things and
something that Wimpey itself was very good at.
Wimpey decided to enter the PDL redevelopment
market by establishing a new business unit (more about
this in the section that follows). George Wimpey City, as
the unit was eventually called, followed a different
approach to that of Berkeley. In the words of one senior
manager they did ‘‘what a true developer does’’, they
brought all the necessary elements together and they
managed the process. They worked with contractors
under JCT ‘Design and Build’ contracts which
consequently meant that there was limited flexibility
to alter the scheme once construction begun. This
flexibility was further limited by the size of the
developments which George Wimpey City was under-
taking in the mid-2000s, up to 150 units. This size of
development is equivalent to one big apartment block
like Falcon Wharf, a flagship development of George
Wimpey City. Although this size is 1/6–1/8 the size of
developments like Chelsea Bridge Wharf it is still a
significant endeavour, bearing in mind that the vast
majority of UK housebuilders will produce around or
less than 150 units a year.
The strategic review of 2005/2006 which led to a
decision to mainstream PPG3 compliant schemes and
withdraw from ‘high rise exceptionalism’ meant that
most ‘high rise’ projects belonging to special units had
either to be shelved or sold and eventually meant that
the 800-unit ‘Green Bank’ project in Leeds had to be
abandoned in 2007 although the first two phases had
sold out. The capital intensive nature of these projects
and the concern of the mother company that the
apartment market was fragile led to the decision to exit
the market altogether at a time when George Wimpey
City was upscaling.
The effects of policy restrictions on land inputs and
the type of response chosen had acute consequences for
Wimpey. In mid-2000 the company initiated a long term
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proportion of ‘short-term’ land (i.e. land at an advanced
stage in the development pipeline) in favour of more
‘mid-term’ and ‘long term’ holdings. In the 2006
presentation of Peter Johnson (the Group CEO) to the
AGM, the short term land bank is quoted as being faced
with a ‘‘rapid unwinding of stock profits’’ (Johnson,
2006, p. 14). In the same presentation Johnson reiterated
that the company was faced with adverse market
conditions (especially a reduction in total transactions
and a short order book) and was thus redoubling its
efforts to diversify their product mix (mainly towards
more affordable housing) whilst withdrawing from non-
performing businesses like high-rise (i.e. the niche PDL
brands mentioned in the previous paragraphs). Buying
larger sites at better terms and cutting costs were to be
key in driving future profitability. This approach
however came late in the market cycle thus the
company run into difficulties following the 2007
downturn in the UK. As a result it merged with Taylor
Woodrow, a housebuilder with similar profile and size in
a deal that gave 49% of the new company to previous
Wimpey shareholders.
The company’s approach appears to have changed
thereafter and in 2010 the Taylor Wimpey annual report
(Taylor Wimpey, 2010, p. 4) explains that the company
creates and delivers value:
 By ‘‘purchasing the right sites, in the right locations at
the right price’’.
 By ‘‘designing a sustainable community that meets
the needs of local residents, is attractive to potential
customers and provides attractive returns for share-
holders’’ through ‘‘a consultative and iterative process
of community engagement’’.
 By controlling cost and quality through careful
procurement and subcontracting.
 By exceptional pre- and post-sales customer care.
Their process begins from a network of strategic land
experts in the UK who are tasked with identifying areas
where population growth, or other local demand, could
create opportunities to promote land with no current
planning consent through the planning system (Taylor
Wimpey, 2010, p. 5).
The company claims that they ‘‘. . .have a strong
track record of consultation with local residents prior to
developing large scale communities.’’ and thus they
. . .are able to identify the best use of land to meet the
needs of local residents, ensure that we have a mix of
homes that meet market demand and that the site isoptimised for safe, efficient and considerate devel-
opment. (Taylor Wimpey, 2010, p. 5)
They explicitly mention that their experience on
community consultation puts them in good stead in view
of the provisions of the Localism Bill and its
requirements.
Housebuilders like Wimpey faced (or believed they
faced) the biggest bottlenecks in the planning applica-
tion phase. A usual complaint of housebuilders and in
this case of Wimpey’s management teams is that local
planning authorities are unresponsive to government
policy in the sense that local councillors and planners do
not easily approve of developments that adhere to the
new higher density requirements and that they have
‘excessive’ demands from the s. 106 agreement. The
technological barrier for traditional construction meth-
ods stands at 6–7 storeys which means that densities
above a certain limit cannot be achieved unless site
coverage increases and/or unit size decreases.
5.2.2. Wimpey’s adaptation to policy change
George Wimpey Plc, was one of the biggest UK
housebuilders in terms of volume until 2007 when it
merged with Taylor Woodrow. The key feature of
Wimpey’s strategy prior to 2007 was the focus on tried
and tested recipes that have characterised their way of
doing business for several years. Faced with the changes
in government policy and in the wider business
environment, the company tried to make the most out
of existing know-how by slightly adapting it to the new
circumstances while on the other hand they tentatively
and rather belatedly explored ‘new ways’, based
however on the tried and tested recipes with regard
to development and market risks. Following the merger
the new company, Taylor Wimpey, implemented a
strategy which emphasised the importance of land in the
value adding process and highlighted the significance of
changes in policy and community engagement. How-
ever, the discussion in this part will mostly cover the
years up to 2007 mainly because the merger itself is a
liminal event for Wimpey.
During the 30 years preceding the merger with
Taylor Woodrow the company shifted from a construc-
tion conglomerate with global reach to a housebuilder
covering most of UK’s housing markets both geogra-
phically and in terms of prices and products offered,
with significant activity in North America and presence
in Spain too. The company had a long history of
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), a strong indication
of ‘competition for the present’ (see Section 2).
Indicatively, in 1995–1996 Wimpey exchanged assets
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(the housebuilding arm of TARMAC, a business
almost as big as Wimpey Homes) with the Wimpey
Group. In 2001 George Wimpey paid £461 million to
acquire Mc Alpine Homes from Alfred Mc Alpine Plc
that was then in a process of transforming from a
construction group to a facilities management and
utility services business (Mc Alpine, 2005). Con-
secutively, in 2002, Laing Homes was also acquired.
This was a specialist PDL housebuilder who had
developed a highly innovative design and construc-
tion skills base that allowed construction of housing
‘‘tailored to suit’’ each individual site (Laing Homes,
2005). Laing had a very strong track record of
building Housing Association housing and upmarket
PDL developments in London and the Home
Counties.
These M&As were to some extend facilitated by
borrowing, thus gearing in 2006 stood at 23% following
a sustained effort to bring it down from 34% in 2005.
This approach allowed George Wimpey Plc to extend its
geographical coverage and product and price range to
cover most of the UK. Among other reasons, the
company was using diversification into various market
segments and geographical areas as a risk management
strategy. The 2006 Annual Report (George Wimpey Plc,
2006, p. 2) summarised this approach:
Our 26 regional businesses and three satellites in the
UK give our operations significant scale and truly
national geographic coverage. Each business unit
provides a range of products, from one bedroom
apartments and starter homes to large detached
family homes.
This approach to housebuilding was in striking
contrast to the Berkeley’s strategic orientation and hints
at a different attitude towards risk and uncertainty, much
closer to the traditional housebuilding strategies of
diversification into many market segments, wide
geographical coverage and reliance on M&As to
acquire skills and increase market share.
Wimpey went through several reorganisations in
the years prior to 2007. Indicatively the 2001
reorganisation aimed at reducing costs (staff, build-
ing/procurement) and to increase long term perfor-
mance. It led to the decision to rebrand all the
products of the different divisions to ‘George
Wimpey’. Other aims were:
 to improve the landbank, partially achieved through
the acquisition of Laing;
 to reduce regional businesses from 29 to 21; to devolve responsibilities from the Group to the
divisions;
 to establish 2 companies focusing on inner city
developments one for inner London and one for other
major UK cities, based in Manchester);
 To expand the presence to the US market.
These aims were essentially consolidating the
direction that the company had taken in previous years
in an attempt to tackle the main challenges facing big
non-PDL housebuilders in an era of transition to new
development types. The 2001 Annual Report illus-
trated a point also established through interviews and
the analysis of the company accounts. Wimpey was
adjusting to PDL redevelopment and this was
affecting the types of dwellings produced. At the
same time this delay in changing the product mix is
telling of the difficulties Wimpey was faced with, as
the following quote indicates (George Wimpey, 2001,
p. 15).
The product range now available to customers is well
spread both in geographic and demographic terms
and is well positioned to cater for a broad spectrum
of the market. Inner-city and bespoke developments
have continued to expand as dedicated management
focus on this area of the product portfolio. The level
of activity on brownfield sites has grown to 45%.
Apartments now represent 11% of completions and
58.0% of homes completed in the year were
detached. With a growing shortage of skilled labour,
reassessing how homes are constructed whilst
maintaining a high level of customer satisfaction
is becoming a greater priority. A Research and
Development Manager has been appointed who will
concentrate on the research aspect of the challenge
during 2002. This will entail assessing already
proven building techniques around the world to
ensure the Company is well prepared for changes
over the next generation of housebuilding.
It is worth noting that while the company was
moving towards more flat production, it still produced a
substantial number of detached houses. Following the
acquisition of McAlpine (completed October 2001,
£463 million) Wimpey not only increased its presence
in the booming south but also acquired a big landbank of
high quality that would cover the Group’s needs in the
south for two years after the acquisition (George
Wimpey, 2001, pp. 5, 14). The landbank was further
enhanced in terms of PDL following the acquisition of
Laing yet the composition of the company’s output
changed very slowly.
N. Karadimitriou / Progress in Planning 82 (2013) 1–41 27Increased operational efficiency and streamlining
was an expressed goal in the corporate strategy
documentation whereas themes like urban regeneration
and sustainability first featured in the company’s
strategic visioning well into the 2000s. Peter Johnson
(the company’s Chief Executive) succinctly sum-
marised the situation in 2006:
In 2001 we restructured the business to one with an
efficient overhead structure and product range and
low build costs. We acquired McAlpine Homes and
invested in our landbank, raising hurdle rates to
deliver improved margins. We acquired Laing
Homes to give us a second brand to support organic
growth. However, our landbank remained short and
our strategic land limited. With few sites coming
forward with older planning permissions, the
implementation of Government planning policy,
PPG3, impacted us faster than most. Underlying
build costs rose sharply as our build efficiencies were
eroded. When prices stopped rising, margins fell as
high build costs on bespoke PPG3 schemes
compounded the higher land costs associated with
a short landbank. Lessons have been learned, and
changes made. Going forward, all regional busi-
nesses will have the opportunity to use both the
George Wimpey and Laing Homes brands. This will
allow better use of large sites and provide greater
returns on future land purchases. We have re-
established an efficient overhead structure and
product range which meet the needs of today’s
market and planning regime and which again give us
lower build costs. The use of standard building
elements and a full range of PPG3 preferred house
types are re-establishing our former time and cost
advantages, whilst enabling us to meet local
planning requirements for variety of elevation
without the requirement for bespoke developments
(George Wimpey, 2006, p .6).
Until that point, Wimpey’s senior management
appeared to be reluctant to radically reorient the
company in response to the new post-1995 policy
regime and the business environment it created. Instead
it seems to have followed the model which Ball also
refers to in his work (Ball, 1983). This model is based
on spreading market risk by covering all the UK and
several market segments then hedging that risk by
operating overseas, i.e. in the US market and to a lesser
extent in the Spanish market. Well into the 2000s (in
2006) the company referred to its activities as house-
building, with little mention of regeneration and thecorporate website scarcely mentioned issues of sustain-
ability and the latest government agenda. PDL
redevelopment was treated as a market niche which
was to be exploited by specialised subsidiaries
operating in high margin areas like the Thames
waterfront.
Parallel to the effort to increase market share and
skills base through M&As and as part of the strategy to
expand into new markets by establishing new business
units, Wimpey decided to move into what it perceived as
the growing niche market for inner city apartments in
high density developments, like multi storey blocks.
The company realised with some delay that there
existed an emerging market niche for upmarket
apartments on prime locations in London (mainly
riverside) or other major cities and that the skills
required to build high rise PDL developments are
specialised and new to housebuilders. Indeed, more
common methods (like timber frame) are economically
and technically feasible for buildings up to six to seven
storeys. Above that height new materials and construc-
tion methods have to be deployed (for example
structural concrete, curtain walling) which are unusual
for the traditional housebuilding industry but are widely
used in commercial property construction.
Following the acquisition of Alfred McAlpine and
thus the acquisition of its portfolio of ‘urban projects’,
two business units were established in 2001, George
Wimpey City to cover the metropolitan areas outside
London (mainly covering Manchester and the North)
and George Wimpey Central London for the London
market. The two units merged during the first months of
2004 but the merged unit maintained offices in
Manchester. George Wimpey City was the only unit
that had the capacity and skills to build high rise
apartment blocks by outsourcing most of the necessary
skills. It deployed these skills to tap into the luxury end
of the market, thus directly competing with the
Berkeley Group. Although Wimpey established Inner
London special teams in 2001, product composition has
been changing towards more flats since 1999, indicating
a product shift even before the new specialised business
units begun to have an influence but four years after the
government announced its PDL redevelopment targets.
The business unit had a very narrow remit: to develop
high rise apartment buildings in inner city PDL sites and
was not initially involved with complex long term
projects. Many of the sites had a social housing element
and most of them were mixed use. Although they were
not the only units of the George Wimpey group that
worked with PDL sites they were the ones who
specialised in multi-storey apartment buildings. The





























Fig. 5.5. Wimpey, annual turnover and profits 1990–2010.
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Fig. 5.6. Wimpey, nominal changes in turnover, profits and profit
margin 1991–2010.
Source: Selected company annual reports 1990–2010.other units in the group were developing more
conventional housing schemes with traditional methods
thus tapping into lower margin markets of low density
PDL and medium density PDL or into the lucrative but
restricted low density non-PDL.
Wimpey treated PDL development as a new market
niche in to which they expanded by establishing new
business units. As a result in 2005 the group produced
66% of its output on PDL and still maintained 34% non-
PDL production (in comparison the equivalent percen-
tage for Berkeley was consistently over 95% since
2001). This strategy however, regardless of its
advantages or disadvantages, attracted a ‘UTF follower’
characterisation from the GLA and eventually this more
conservative approach turned out to have limited long
term benefits, as discussed already.
The new entity’s (Taylor Wimpey’s) approach to
generating value is rather different and puts emphasis on
the role of land in the process as described in their 2010
annual report (p. 4):
We generate value for our shareholders through
managing our investment portfolio of land to deliver
optimal returns. These returns are created through
identifying the best opportunities, adding value
through the planning process and designing places to
live that meet the local demand. We deliver this value
through safe, efficient and considerate development
of these communities and helping our customers to
buy and move into their new homes.
In the same document it becomes clear how value
added is derived at:
we have a team of strategic land experts in the UK
who are tasked with identifying areas where
population growth, or other local demand, could
create opportunities to promote land with no current
planning consent through the planning system. (p. 5)
and
Rather than seeing homebuilding as the driver of
value, we see it as the way to deliver the value that we
have created through selecting land and optimising
its value. (p. 9)
This is a very strong hint at the importance of land
speculation, rather than housebuilding itself, in driving
the strategies of a housebuilding company.
5.2.3. Wimpey’s performance
Wimpey was using geographical diversification
globally as a way to manage market uncertainty. Itsdeclining performance in the UK market sped up after
2003 however the US business picked up substantially
during the same period, acting as a buffer to what
otherwise would have been a significant drop in
turnover and profitability. Indicatively, the average
sales price in the UK dropped to £178,000 in 2005 from
£185,000 in 2004 and profit margins declined to 12.9%.
During that same period, US average sales price rose by
7.6% to $313,000 and the profit margin rose to 20%.
The year after that, 2006, saw a further drop in the UK
average sales price effectively squeezing margins and
turnover (Figs. 5.5 and 5.6).
It is important to note once more the significance of
the US business activity which for most of the 2000s
stood in sharp contrast to what was happening in the UK
operations. Dwelling output, nominal turnover and
profits for the US business arm were steadily increasing
since 2000 when data is available. The slowdown that
the US market witnessed after 2005 following the
significant increases in the Federal Reserve interest
rates at the time did have an impact though. The
company’s chairman summarised the situation as
follows (George Wimpey, 2006, p. 6):
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Fig. 5.8. George Wimpey (and Taylor Wimpey), nr. of US dwellings
completed and year on year change 2000–2010.
Source: Selected company annual reports 1990–2010.The housing market in the UK remained difficult
throughout the year, with the total number of
housing transactions for 2005 17% below the
previous year. Against this background, our busi-
nesses did well to deliver total UK volumes similar
to last year as well as significantly increasing our
forward order position entering 2006. The increased
use of incentives needed to achieve this, along with
the impact of a shorter landbank, resulted in reduced
operating profits and margins. By contrast the US
housing markets in which we operate remained very
strong, with national housing starts reaching record
levels. We continued to push forward strongly with
our growth plans and delivered higher volumes,
margins and operating profits. In the US too, we have
come into the new year with a far stronger order
book.
A complete dataset on units sold by Wimpey in the
UK is difficult to find, data on units completed show that
after the asset exchange with TARMAC the number
remained practically stable at around 12,000 units (see
Fig. 5.7). The acquisition of two significant house-
builders, McAlpine and Laing Homes had a minimal
effect on output which dropped dramatically in 2006
reflecting what the 2005 annual report called ‘‘. . .the
most challenging housing market in the UK for a
number of years’’ (George Wimpey Plc, 2005, p. 2).
After the merger with Taylor Woodrow output rose
initially but then stabilised to lower levels as well. Prior
to the merger the two companies were building around
8000 homes each in the UK, in 2010 their combined UK
output was 9962 units. The benefits of the merger
therefore came from shedding excess capacity, staff
layoffs, procurement, etc.
Both companies had significant US presence
























































Fig. 5.7. Wimpey, nr. of UK units completed and year on year change
1993–2010.
Source: Selected company annual reports 1990–2010.scrapped both in the US and in the UK. Thus, post-
merger US output was more or less the same as the
output of each company separately pre-merger (see Fig.
5.8). Finally, the US business of the merged entity
(Taylor Wimpey) was sold in mid-2011.
The course of Wimpey’s profitability both pre and
post-merger is strikingly different to that of Berkeley.
Under the sustained pressure of government policy on
land input the firm’s product mix slowly shifted towards
flats whereas output volume remained steady. In effect
Wimpey found itself selling more of a type of dwellings
with a potentially lower average selling price per unit
while it was stripped of the capacity to sell expensive
dwellings on greenfield land (detached housing, etc.)
and was not able to profitably enter the high end
apartment market. While this dynamic was underway
the primary source of turnover increases for George
Wimpey was the general uplift in housing prices.
Company profitability benefited from a sustained effort
to increase efficiency (a recurring theme in George
Wimpey’s strategies with ambivalent outcomes),
geographical diversification into the US and Spanish
market, as well as some major reorganisation efforts
combined with M&As.
Thus throughout the period examined in this paper,
the focus of the company was hardly, if ever, on future
market share in regeneration and creating sustainable
communities were not at the core of the company’s
strategy and thus were not affecting its business model
substantially until 2006. It is indicative that as part of its
2006 reorganisation the company moved out of units
specialised in high-rise (i.e. high density PDL like
Falcon Wharf) but at the same time tried to mainstream
and standardise PPG3 compliant development. How-
ever, another strategy appeared to be reaping rewards. In
2005 the company’s sales of affordable housing went up
by 48% (average selling price at £98,600, up 10%)
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5% (average selling price £188,600, down 2%).
It was unfortunate for the company that almost as
soon as this reorientation begun to bear fruit (in 2006
UK turnover was up 11% operating profit was up 14%)
the market deteriorated dramatically. The simultaneous
difficulties in all 3 major markets that the Group was
involved in (UK, US, Spain) eventually took their toll
and undermined the position of the whole Group. In July
2007 George Wimpey merged with Taylor Woodrow in
a deal which saw Taylor Woodrow shareholders getting
51% of the shares in the new entity.
5.2.4. Wimpey in action: ‘Falcon Wharf’
The 0.496 ha site is bounded to the west by the
Thames, to the east by Lombard Rd., to the south by the
Heliport and a timber merchant’s warehouse and to the
north by another residential development (Oyster
Wharf). The site was under Council ownership and
was used as a vehicle repair depot, building works
depot, highways depot and laundry. At the end of the
90s Frogmore Estates, a property investor/trader bought
it through their subsidiary, Harbour Land Ltd., with the
intent of getting planning permission and either sell on
or find a partner for a joint venture. This was in line with
their standard business practice, especially for house-
building where development activity is usually under-
taken by a development partner. In the case of Falcon
Wharf the site was sold with detailed planning
permission to Wimpey who implemented it with slight
alterations as will be discussed below. Following their
strategic review of 2005/06 Wimpey set up a joint
venture called Falcon Wharf Ltd. with the Royal Bank
of Scotland and sold to it the land and associated
development works for £31.7 million.
In similar fashion to Chelsea Bridge Wharf this site
was also partially in use prior to its acquisition by
Frogmore and various applications for planning
permission had previously faced difficulties with
planning conditions or the s.106 agreement. Falcon
Wharf (Picture 2), has a plot ratio of 4:1 and the building
was to be 55 m high (later revised to 59 m). This site is
also on a prime location, situated within a fabric of
active warehousing and light industrial uses that are
now enmeshed with new luxury residential develop-
ments. In this particular case, a heliport is also present
and as any visitor to the area can say, it is also very
intensively used. The site was originally owned by the
London Borough of Wandsworth and is located on a
strip that witnessed a lot of speculative activity during
the last 15 years. Most of the waterfront to the north and
south of the site has been or is currently developed forresidential/mixed use schemes. It was however hardly a
‘brownfield’ site as it was actively used by more than
one users for more than one uses.
Originally, Harbour Land Ltd envisaged a develop-
ment with 119 dwellings, 14 of which (12%) would be
affordable, a hotel with swimming pool, a small
restaurant, 207 parking spaces and a riverwalk
extending over the water which would render the dock
unusable. Following consultation with the LPA the
scheme increased in height and size but alterations
occurred in its relationship to the river as well. The
riverwalk was redesigned to be built over land, the dock
remained usable and became better integrated into the
site. It applied for planning permission in 2000 for a 149
unit scheme to include a restaurant and office space as
an alternative to the hotel. Wimpey bought the site from
Harbour Land with planning permission in 2002 and
applied for alterations to the permission in order to
make the development more profitable by tuning it
better the market conditions prevailing at the time. This
new application was faced with significant difficulties
and delays. This was because the affordable housing
policy requirement had changed between the date
planning permission was granted to Frogmore and the
date Wimpey applied for the alterations. Finally, the
developer and the LPA agreed that affordable housing
would be provided off site but this only happened after
the application attracted the attention of the Mayor of
London. Construction, based on those alterations,
begun in 2003 yet planning permission was granted
one year before completion, in 2005, due to problems
with the section 106 agreement. After 2006 the joint
venture scheme (Falcon Wharf Ltd.) applied for some
alterations mainly with a view to expanding the size of a
few top floor rooms and of the penthouse (apparently
bought by Iqbal Latif). In 2007 Iqbal Latif bought the
freehold of the whole scheme and reinstated the hotel, a
change which required the provision of a gym and spa as
well as changes in the restaurant space. After it was
completed in 2006 and even more so after the hotel was
developed the scheme attracted a lot of attention for its
high architectural and environmental sustainability
standards and received several awards (Table 4).
There may not have been a significant local
residential community in the area in 2000 but there
was a significant number of small business interests.
From the 33 neighbours only three objections were
received originally, plus two more after the final
revisions. The Heliport mounted the most vociferous
opposition to the development mainly because of
concerns about the effects that a high rise tower would
have on air navigation and landing procedures because
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60 beds –of the changes in wind circulation. After the involve-
ment of the new owners in 2007 the number of planning
applications increased (to reach 17 in total by 2010),
partially reflecting changes in the mix of uses and the
composition of units to align the development with the
market situation and partially reflecting cosmetic and
design alterations to the landscaping and the building.
At that stage, there is also a more established local
community so the number of participants in the
planning consultation also rose though often the
representations were in favour of the proposed changes.
If one was to apply de Magalhaes’ ‘Functions and
phases’ matrix in the case of this development one
would find that the most interesting feature in terms of
the way the different functions and phases are
articulated is the separation between the phases of
Mediation and Development (see Table 5). Indeed
Harbour Land handled the mediation phase and profited
from it but this separation into discrete stages allowed
George Wimpey City to be involved in the DevelopmentPicture 2. Falcon Wharf under construction.
Source: Author.phase in terms of ownership and finance provision with
the architects, Burland TM, bridging the gap between
mediation and development.
All other aspects of the development process were
handled by agents external to George Wimpey City.
This indicates that in essence George Wimpey City
acted as a developer who allocated a certain amount of
resources on their project and outsourced most other
functions in an effort to make a return as quickly as
possible based on a relatively fixed development
proposal. This is in contrast to the direct involvement
of Berkeley in most phases and functions, constantly
striving to add value to the development by a series of
modifications and alterations.
The functions phases and interactions shown in Table
5 are as follows: (1) freehold sale; (2) internal capital
financing; (3) asset purchase from RBS; (4) consultancy
arrangements; (5) planning or other permissions; (6)
JCT Design & Build contracts; (6) bank financing or
other sources suitable for small investors or owner
occupiers; (7) rental agreements. Prior to the formation
of the joint venture, George Wimpey City had an
overdraft facility with the parent company (George
Wimpey Plc) similar to the arrangement Berkeley
Homes/Chelsea Bridge Wharf and indeed similar to the
arrangements of most housebuilders who rarely if ever
use development specific borrowing facilities.
The project was self-financed, the original capital
inflow from the parent company was to be repaid sales
begun. However, the timescale of the development was
such that this turnover period was planned to be rather
short and forward sales would ensure that the negative
balance was limited even further. In reality, the
problems with the planning permission meant that
sales could not proceed as fast as it was envisaged,
causing difficulties with the cash flow of the scheme and
thus exposing the parent company to risks to which it
did not want to be exposed. The lesson was learned and
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Table 5
Functions, phases and interactions in the development process.
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Ltdforward selling was employed more successfully in
later developments.
Until Falcon Wharf Ltd. was established, George
Wimpey City operated autonomously and had full
control over the development. They started work on a
site either by formulating a general idea of what the
development should be by doing a preliminary
appraisal. They did not have the capacity to locate
land through their own agents so they relied on sites
coming forward through third parties (agents ordevelopers). The site was then appraised by the
Development Manager in cooperation with the cost
consultant and if the appraisal showed that it was
feasible then they either bought an option or bought the
site outright depending on the circumstances. The site
for Falcon Wharf was bought outright since it was
offered with planning permission following the com-
pletion of ‘Mediation’ by a third party whereas several
other sites were inherited from Alfred McAlpine at
similar or more advanced stages.
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Compleon
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Acquisi on, 
Plannin g and 
Design
Fig. 5.9. The distinct stages of development in Falcon Wharf.A team comprising the Development Manager,
planning, architecture and cost consultants revised
the plan and sought to change it to fit market conditions
better. However, although the changes were minimal,
changing the s. 106 agreement in order to provide
affordable housing was difficult. The process is
relatively linear and separated in discrete stages
essentially under the control of one person at any one
time, the Development Manager during the planning
stage and the Commercial Director during the devel-
opment phase. This compartmentalisation of the
development process is an important aspect of the
way Wimpey treats development (Fig. 5.9).
The Development Manager organised the process
and made key decisions about the site, sometimes in
cooperation with other departments up to the point
where development begun. Thereafter the Development
Manager handed over to the Commercial Director who
had responsibility over sales and the Project Director
who had responsibility over construction.
Since this particular site was brought to Wimpey
with planning permission through personal contacts
(between Carillion, Frogmore/Harbour Land and
Wimpey) the profit potential was lower because the
added value of gaining planning permission was
included in the price of land. The design for the site
was re-worked with the original architect’s help in
order to maximise development potential, this again
was the usual GWC approach for sites which were
bought with planning permission. This particular site
however was given special attention since it is a prime
waterfront site and therefore GWC identified its
potential to be a flagship project. To achieve those
characteristics the product had to undergo some
modifications that would make it more attractive to
the potential clients who would aspire to the lifestyle
the development represents. The uses originally
envisaged by Harbour Land also had to be changed,the content of the commercial element in particular.
Therefore the Hotel gave its place to a bigger restaurant
and a bigger office element only for the decision to be
reversed after the market was tested and no tenants
could be found for the office space.
The marketing strategy for this development also
depended on selling a ‘lifestyle’, capitalising on the
vibrancy and vitality of nearby Battersea, a message
that was reinforced after the hotel–restaurant–spa
complex where put in place. The development even
had its own website which amongst other things
included a list of upmarket restaurants in the vicinity
of the development.
Within GWC the Development Manager acted as the
coordinator of the process, bringing together the
company experts and occasionally the consultants in
order to find how they can make the most of the site.
Due to the restrictions imposed by the existing design,
the short timeframe, the nature of the D&B contractual
arrangement and the compartmentalisation of the
development process this attempt did not result in
radical transformations other than the change in the
commercial element. Changes of the same magnitude
and of the same nature as these that took place in
Chelsea Bridge Wharf were impossible because of the
procurement method (Design & Build) which is less
flexible in terms of permissible quantitative and
qualitative changes in the development once construc-
tion has begun. There was also limited possibility for
customisation based on customer feedback and forward
sales. This flexibility however is not seen as necessary
in this approach to development since the development
is relatively small and has to finish in one phase, as soon
as possible after starting.
This approach, emphasising speed of delivery of the
whole development in one phase has another interesting
implication. If this approach was to be followed in big
mixed use development schemes then they would need
to be developed in one phase from start to finish. As the
size of the development gets bigger the uncertainties
and risks surrounding all aspects of the development
increase. Thus, although it might be technically possible
to produce a development of 900 units in one go,
provided that enough capital is available, the market
risk inherent in successfully developing and selling so
many units in a short period of time makes it an
endeavour difficult to undertake without substantial
financial backing. As the interviews confirmed, George
Wimpey City started off with developments sized
between 50 and 70 units and gradually moved to
developments up to 150 units, then eventually upscaled
to 800 units. This size however proved to be unsuitable
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The joint venture with RBS not only boosted the
profits of the parent company but also allowed it to
spread the financial risk of the development. A similar
joint venture with Barclays Bank was set up for
another similar development, GN Tower. However, it
was not possible to explore further the implications
that this move had for the development process model
that Wimpey applied to PDL projects since the
company merged with Taylor Woodrow. It is
interesting however that the latest owner of the
freehold (Iqbal Latif) spotted the opportunity pre-
sented by the empty office space, the building’s plant
and the large restaurant, thus merged them into a
hotel, spa and restaurant complex.
5.3. A second look into strategies, norms and
competitive advantage
There are 10 key points structuring the theoretical
background of this research, reviewed below:
(i) Changes in the business environment affect
businesses in a fundamental way.
(ii) Economic, institutional and social factors act as
filters that sort out which paths are to be followed
from a multitude of feasible futures.
(iii) The capacity of a firm to survive a change in its
environment depends on the fitness of its
strategies and their translation to organisational
routines.
(iv) A company’s competitive strategy effectively
relies on combining activities in a way that gives it
an advantageous position against its rivals.
(v) If ‘new ways of doing things’ offer a competitive
advantage then they are likely to spread via
imitation or via the better chances of survival of
the firms who have that advantage.
(vi) Economic actors are purposeful profit seekers but
follow norms and routines in the pursuit of their
goals, these norms and routines bind actors but are
subject to reviews depending on the circum-
stances.
(vii) Strategic competition is about the future, concerns
for operational efficiency and market share are
about the present.
(viii) Strategic competition requires strategic intent
which in turn requires an unorthodox, contrarian
stance.
(ix) The development process is rife in risks and
uncertainties at all its stages.(x) Housebuilding has a wholesale and a construction
aspect to it, the wholesale aspect is much more
uncertain but has much higher returns.
The two firms examined in this paper treat house-
building in very different ways, although they are faced
with the same business conditions. The housing market
is notoriously volatile and therefore notoriously difficult
to predict, housebuilding is rife with uncertainty as
became evident from the previous sections. This
uncertainty and the brave assumptions that house-
builders have to make about the future course of the
market has been the main source of corporate closures
in times of sudden market decline.
The stakes were high for George Wimpey Plc and for
the Berkeley Group from the moment that the
sustainability agenda entered the mainstream of UK
policy making. Within the social, economic and cultural
context of the UK a restriction on greenfield develop-
ment and push towards the brownfields was bound to
raise a wide range of responses from absolute rejection
to wholehearted support. A multitude of feasible future
ways of producing the built environment opened up the
moment the government begun to set targets on land
reuse, densification and use mix. At least six of these
scenarios have been identified in this paper. These
potential new futures were more than mere possibilities,
all of them were tried to a small or large extent by
housebuilders around the country. Someone in the
housebuilding world however would have to imagine
what these future urban quarters would comprise,
understand what it would take to get there and relate to
the workings, the strengths and the weaknesses of their
firm. Only few of these scenarios where viable, as
companies like Persimmon discovered when they tried
to develop low density PDL schemes.
Wimpey followed what seemed to be a conservative
approach, realigning its strategic direction very slowly,
apparently held back by the inflexibility of managerial
mental frames and huge legacy costs mainly related to
their landbank. It may well have been the case that they
thought PDL redevelopment would be a temporary
phenomenon or that it would not catch up given the
cultural significance of the rural idyll in the UK. On the
other hand Berkeley shed its old identity of high end
greenfield housebuilder and engaged actively in a
process of refining the skills and routines required in
order to tackle the task of creating upmarket, high
density, mixed use schemes.
Both companies developed strategies and employed
norms and routines to tackle the risks and uncertainties
embedded in the development process. At the macro
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to cover several market niches. It remained a company
very much concerned about operational efficiency,
speedy site turnover, standardisation and land specula-
tion. It was buoyed by the upturn in the overseas
markets it had expanded to but in the UK it stagnated in
spite of rampant house price inflation. It tried to
maintain or gain market share by M&As which however
increased their gearing ratio substantially.
Berkeley opted for focus, both geographically and in
terms of market coverage. With time it transformed
itself to the dominant market actor in housebuilding in
London. It has achieved this through a learning process,
by testing the market early on and by strategically pre-
empting the policies of the government. Wimpey went
through a learning process as well, ‘lessons were
learned’ said the annual report in 2006. Yet the
realisation that the ‘genetic coding’ of the firm needs
to change and therefore that the firm needs to reorient
itself towards more profitable activities (like affordable
housing and PDL dwellings) came too late to make a
difference to Wimpey’s fate.
At the project level, Wimpey established special
business units to deal with the issue of PDL
development although it had acquired two companies
that had such expertise. George Wimpey City with
Falcon Wharf was tapping into the market for high-end
dwellings in mixed use developments for consumers
seeking a luxurious lifestyle. Its marketing pitch was
very similar to that of Berkeley. The process of
development was treated in discrete stages with
minimal overlap and limited information feedback
loops. George Wimpy City for example had only
limited involvement in the Mediation and Consumption
stages. Emphasis was put on minimising exposure to
uncertainty and risk within each stage by pursuing the
fast delivery of the outputs of each stage so that the next
stage could proceed. This latter attitude was the cause of
conflict with the LPA and put the development at risk
since it essentially went ahead without a finalised s.106
agreement. Not much room for collaboration was left
after that.
Berkeley developed and mainstreamed throughout
the organisation sets of rules, practices, norms, routines
to manage uncertainty through a flexible approach
towards development. This approach, which enhanced
the firm’s competitive advantage, is based on collabora-
tion and on flexibility towards the planning and design
of the product and relies on the incorporation of market
feedback into the development process. If successful,
this approach, maximises the ability of the company to
respond to market fluctuations by modifying the mix ofuses, the style, type and size of the apartments or the
specifications of whatever space it is creating. At the
same time, phasing allows parts of the development to be
occupied whilst other parts are still under construction.
The success of the development project if this
approach is followed depends more on the successful
management and coordination of the project and much
less on market conditions or fluctuations in the business
environment. However, the practice of modifying a
project from phase to phase in order to suit market
conditions better might actually create an issue of
community participation for the surrounding residents
and users who were consulted at the early days of the
project. The same applies for the tenants who move in at
later stages and for the LPA who may discover that the
end project will not be what they expected or wanted it
to be.
The outcomes of these two approaches could not be
more divergent. PDL redevelopment and urban regen-
eration where not mainstreamed at Wimpey and when
the company was struck by a secular downturn in all the
markets they had diversified to, they faced severe
financial difficulties. Berkeley grew at a dramatic pace,
its profit margins steadily remained the industry average
or higher. The growth of the group is ‘organic’, based on
tapping early on into hitherto unexploited market
niches. A recent reorganisation exemplifies this, the
Group’s structure includes a division specialising in
contemporary forms of non-market housing and a
division keeping an eye on strategic land opportunities
with some knowledge of lower density suburban
housebuilding. Ironically, these are competencies that
Wimpey also had and actually intended to develop
further before it was struck by the turn in the market.
The comparison of the way these two projects were
developed revealed quite a few similarities but also
uncovered some key differences between the two
companies. Berkeley, in the form of Chelsea Bridge
Wharf Ltd. has applied a development method that
capitalises on change by implementing an approach to
development that emphasises information flow within
the company and between the company and its
environment. The result is that the project at Chelsea
Bridge Wharf has undergone significant alterations
throughout its lifetime and each phase of its develop-
ment is much better tuned to the needs of the market,
thus it can sell quicker and at a premium. Even when the
dwellings are sold on and therefore the developer
disengages, provisions are made that the scheme
remains under a united Freehold therefore putting in
place the conditions for a high standard property
maintenance and management service.
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involvement as the process of mediation and develop-
ment remain under the strict control of the company in
its various guises. The scale of the whole development
is also much larger than Falcon Wharf since the project
is not treated as a ‘one-off’ but as a constantly evolving
process which yields different outcomes at each phase.
Chelsea Bridge Wharf is a characteristic mixed use high
density development project like many others that the
Group undertakes, as a matter of fact its size is
significantly smaller compared to other projects which
can be twice as big.
It is not possible to say with certainty whether
Berkeley is a ‘contrarian’ company whose people
possess an unorthodox way of thinking. It clearly has
strategic intent and given the way the housebuilding
industry operates and the criticism it regularly receives
with regard to its pace of innovation it may well be the
case that what Berkeley does, appears to be radical
because a lot of its competitors follow more tradition-
alist approaches. Whatever the case may be however,
the company enjoys a clear competitive advantage in
the markets it operates and it dominates them to the
point that it poses a threat to the competitive function of
the London market for new-built housing and therefore
to the land market as well.
6. Conclusions
Housebuilding in the UK has undergone an era of
dramatic change in many respects since the mid-1990s.
The main focus of this paper was the transformation
occurring in housebuilding as a result of policy changes
generating new risks and uncertainties for house-
building firms. These changes promoted urban living
and new types of urban environments, in the form of
denser mixed use developments, more stringent
environmental standards and a greater social mix.
Arguably, the change of government in 2010 created
some uncertainty as to the future direction of urban
policy, the NPPF continues to focus on the re-use of
PDL and the Localism Act embraces pre-application
consultation.
Although it emerged as a concept in the early 1970s,
sustainability has increasingly influenced British urban
policy from the early 1990s onwards. Thereafter, UK
governments started to favour city revitalisation and the
return to urban living as opposed to suburban or rural
lifestyles. These new ideals for urban living have been
consolidated through a series of documents the most
important of which arguably was ‘Sustainable Com-
munities: Building for the Future’ (ODPM, 2003a). Thisdocument epitomised the Labour government’s
approach and advanced its implementation, either by
establishing a set of principles that should guide future
growth or by addressing the funding issues that
accompanied this effort.
The brownfields vs. greenfields debate and the
promotion of high density mixed use schemes in order
to protect the countryside have had a significant impact
on the housebuilding industry. That industry comprises
firms whose business is the transformation of space
from one configuration of uses and users to another.
From a ‘production process’ point of view this is an
industry whose ‘raw material’ is land (previously used
or unused) and its output is dwellings or groups of
dwellings. If one wants to affect change at the level of
industry therefore, one very effective way to do it is to
affect the input of land.
Following the detailed examination of the strategy-
making process and the effects that each firm’s
approach had on its financial position and its output
it can confidently be argued that there are significant
differences between the way the two companies handled
the development process and associated risks. Berkeley
benefits from specialisation but is more exposed to one
market in terms of geography and market segment.
Wimpey on the other hand remained at the top of the
league through M&As and was much more diversified.
The two companies examined in this paper treated
housebuilding in different ways, although they were
faced with similar business conditions. The housing
market is notoriously volatile and therefore notoriously
difficult to predict but the development process as such
is not very certain either as Byrne (1996) has discussed.
A traditional ‘current trader’ (see DCLG, 2007)
housebuilder response to this type of market has been to
diversify in terms of geography and market segments.
George Wimpey entered the 1980s as a construction
conglomerate, active in most construction activities and
ended the 2000s in a merger with Taylor Woodrow, one
of the oldest housebuilding companies. George Wimpey
was a construction conglomerate but eventually a
radical restructuring effort led to an asset exchange with
TARMAC in the mid 90s. Thereafter, George Wimpey
Plc became almost exclusively focused on house-
building and made sustained efforts to increase profits
mainly by focusing on operational efficiency, a sign of
‘competition for the present’.
To complement this efficiency drive, the company
expanded its geographical coverage and product range
mainly through M&As. It also expanded its activity in
the US market as a further way of diversifying its
business and its market exposure. Indeed the US activity
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(20% operating margin in the US for 2005 compared to
12.9% for the UK). In the UK market the margins were
close to the industry average and growth in terms of
output was static, indicating that turnover and profit
growth depended on housing price inflation, M&As and
efficiency gains.
The involvement of the group into the redevelopment
of high density PDL followed the same logic. The
company found it difficult to adjust its existing practices
and product range to fit high density mixed use long
term PDL requirements and thus set up a specialised
subsidiary to exploit a specific market niche: the inner
city high margin markets of London and Manchester.
The activities of the subsidiary grew significantly in the
few years following its establishment but eventually it
was deemed to be exposing Wimpey to risks that the
company did not want to assume. At the same time other
Wimpey subsidiaries were also beginning to develop
PDL sites but part of their effort was focused on lower
density PDL whereas the company’s capacity to
develop high density developments was also limited
by the traditional housebuilding construction methods.
Thus it appears that George Wimpey had some
difficulty in realigning itself to the new business
environment it was faced with, its financial position
deteriorated and eventually the company merged with
another top-10 housebuilding firm in order to avoid
bankruptcy.
The Berkeley Group on the other hand transformed
itself from a small housebuilder of exclusive suburban
detached housing to a ‘regenerator’ at the forefront of
mixed use long term PDL redevelopment. It tested the
market early on in the 1990s and strategically aligned
itself with government policy. It managed market
uncertainty through a flexible approach towards
development which is based on flexibility towards the
planning and design of the product and relying on the
incorporation of market feedback into the development
process.
The company does not tackle market volatility by
diversifying in terms of geography and market
segments. Instead it specialises in upmarket, high
margin, mixed use developments in relatively few
selected markets and prominent locations. During
periods of housing market downturns the commercial
and affordable housing activities are partly compensat-
ing for the decline in profits from speculative house-
building whereas significant amounts of capital and
channelled towards land buying. There are no geo-
graphical or other boundaries between company
subsidiaries but in any case the Group is only activein London and the South East of England and almost
exclusively engaged in PDL development. The outcome
of this strategic approach to development is that the
company has grown at a dramatic pace during the boom
years and has built a dominant position in the London
and South East market which allowed it to stay
profitable during the downturn. Its profit margins are
steadily high in part due to its capacity to exploit
strategic land opportunities.
A major element of any housebuilder’s strategy is the
preoccupation with market volatility and the house-
builder’s inability to predict which way the market will
turn next. The switch from non-PDL to PDL caused
both housebuilders to restructure their landbanks, a key
element of their competitive strategy and their profit-
ability. This reorganisation is a very difficult thing to
achieve in the short term and it incurs substantial costs
to housebuilders. Other than that, the two housebuilders
had to rethink the way they manage the development
process. The traditional sequential approach was
challenged by approaches stressing flexibility, mixed
uses, phasing and contemporality, in what can be termed
the ‘development management’ approach. As Ball
(1983) has eloquently discussed, this volatility forces
most housebuilding firms to adopt production methods
that would allow them to stop production and exit the
market very quickly if the market takes a downwards
trend and at the same time would allow them to speed up
the production cycle if the market is booming. In a
business environment were the final product is a single-
use housing development, a sensible housebuilding firm
would subcontract their labour force, maintain minimal
investment on capital assets and use a landbank to
regulate the flow of land in the development pipeline.
The emphasis is on speed and on the ability to stop
production and stay on the sidelines during a market
crash, then get back in when things get better. The
additional effect of speeding the cycle is the improve-
ment on the Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), a key
indicator used by investors. This preoccupation with
market volatility is ever present but the policy
requirements during the 2000s to engage in long term
projects and produce mixed-use multifunctional urban
environments on PDL challenged the traditional
approaches designed to tackle that volatility.
The shift to PDL was both an opportunity and a
threat. A threat because mixed use PDL schemes are
more complicated to plan, design, build and manage
than a single use scheme on non-PDL. This means that a
prolonged and thorough engagement of the developer
with the development is necessary. At the same time
mixed use schemes allow simultaneous access to more
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scheme can be seen as a portfolio diversification
opportunity, where mix of uses is adjusted in order to
mitigate market risks.
Berkeley manages these uncertainties by approach-
ing development flexibly. A long term engagement with
development of a site is seen as normal from a company
that calls itself a ‘Regenerator’. Market volatility is
therefore managed or even exploited through diversi-
fication and phasing. The type of uses and the
composition of the development (types of apartments
built, square metres of each use) is under almost
constant adjustment. This adjustment is based on what
the multiskilled teams managing the project (and the
development manager leading them) think that the
market wants at the time when construction in each
phase of the development begins. This flexibility
requires an equally continuous renegotiation of the
planning permission which in turn requires a good
working relation with the Local Planning Authority. At
the project level, the emphasis on flexibility and, to
some extent, on collaboration contribute to the firm’s
competitive advantage.
Focusing on the construction element of housing
development is only part of the picture. Planning policy
promotes higher densities albeit for reasons like
liveability, land conservation, energy efficiency and
public transport viability. This means that in tradition-
ally built housing developments on urban PDL the need
to maintain or increase margins puts pressure on
‘affordable housing’ provision and/or quality and unit
size standards. Higher densities mean more capital
intensive development, in fact the construction costs of
high density are so much higher that whereas in non-
PDL housebuilding the cost of land comprises up to
40% of the total cost, in PDL housebuilding this is
closer to 10%. Indeed, one of the biggest early
achievements of Taylor Wimpey was that they managed
to stabilise selling prices but brought purchase price per
plot at £30,000 compared to £45,000 that George
Wimpey was paying per plot just before the merger.
Interestingly, for buildings above six to seven storeys
there needs to be a ‘transition’ into different technol-
ogies and materials (structural concrete, curtain walling
etc.) that are more expensive per square metre and their
use makes much more financial sense when applied to
high-rise blocks. This technological transition requires
a big investment in know-how and a significant
restructuring of the supply chain of the producers.
Faced with this reality, one of the housebuilders looked
into adopted the new technological paradigm and
abandoned some key aspects of the old way ofhousebuilding altogether without shedding off other
important elements like strategic landbanking.
This result accords with the expectations of the
theoretical insights explored in section 2 and is a
remarkable conclusion since Berkeley took a ‘risky’
approach if seen under the lens of conventional
housebuilding. It radically transformed itself from a
small suburban high end developer to a major house-
builder engaging in long term, complex mixed use
schemes. However, the Berkeley approach turned out to
be a well calculated and orchestrated exercise in
capacity building that pre-empted the changes in the
business environment.
For the housebuilding sector as a whole it took four
to five years to respond in the changes in government
policy at a scale big enough to make a difference. In Fig.
3.1 it is evident that the average density of dwellings in
new developments suddenly leaped between 2001 and
2003 and then almost stabilised from 2006 onward
regardless of the market conditions. If one accepts that
higher density development is initself more sustainable
but also a proxy for potentially more sustainable built
environments this leap in densities post-2002 indicates
a structural shift and in effect demonstrates that the aim
of the government to steer the housebuilding sector
towards what it understood as more ‘sustainable’ forms
of development was relatively successful. Indeed, other
indicators, like land consumption also point to the same
direction (Karadimitriou,  2005). Thus one could
plausibly argue that until 2007 the housebuilding
industry was indeed satisfying the government agenda
to an extent, notwithstanding the perennial problem of
low overall production. The analysis in this paper is
also an interesting insight into how housebuilders may
have achieved this by changing their ‘ways of doing
things’ and thus the configurations of products they
offered.
Since 2007 however, there seems to be a new trend
emerging, one that may actually become even more
puzzling and more difficult to label as ‘sustainable’ as
the new government agenda begins to affect house-
building. This new trend combines a substantial drop in
overall housing production, average densities of new
developments remaining stable at pre-2007 highs and a
drop in the proportion of new dwellings that are flats.
This may well mean that the UK housebuilding sector is
entering a very polarised era where production will
comprise on the one hand very high density develop-
ments in urban areas (mainly London, mostly Berkeley)
and on the other hand low density multi-bedroom
houses in more rural areas. Would that be a sustainable
outcome, especially in an era of persistently high
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incomes?
In terms of future research, other than the questions
above, this paper poses the question whether the
practices of the Berkeley Group were indeed an
industry-wide trend and if that is the case, how
successful any other companies were and why they
now seem to be abandoning that know-how. There are
indications that Laing and McAlpine were pursuing
strategies similar to Berkeley’s until they were bought
by Wimpey but other smaller or bigger developers
might also have things to offer in that respect. By the
same token it would be very interesting to examine how
housebuilders specialising in greenfield development in
rural or non-metropolitan areas are currently respond-
ing to the introduction of the Localism Act and the
NPPF.
Community participation will in all likelihood be a
key factor affecting future housebuilder practices, in a
context of combined localism and NIMBYism. It is
worth pointing out here that the ‘pre-application
consultation’ requirements which the Localism Act
introduced in 2011 were in fact a key element of the
approach that Berkeley (and other developers) were
following. It is a clear indication of how policy and
business practice can and often do evolve together,
feeding into each other. In the ‘development manage-
ment’ approach there is no clear idea from the outset
about what the development will comprise at the end.
Such certainty does not exist throughout the process.
This however means that the LPA and local commu-
nities are facing difficulties in negotiating planning
obligations whereas tenants who move in at the early
stages may find themselves in front of unexpected
surprises, for better or for worse. The urban environ-
ments that are built today as a result of long terms mixed
use PDL schemes will reflect what the market wants at
each phase of their development but might have a
problem in actually reflecting what the wider needs and
aspirations of present and future residents might be.
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